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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the ethical problems and difficulties that arise when large multinational 
corporations do business in countries suffering from corruption, poverty, and hunger. The 
countries in question are rich in natural resources, yet most of their people receive no benefits 
from the extraction of the resources. The thesis emphasizes the importance of institutions in 
relation to the ethical problems. A case study of Angola is undertaken to illustrate the ethical 
problems. The thesis discusses the problems with different ethical perspectives drawn from 
the three main schools of moral philosophy. The result is a conclusion about the moral 
rightness of actions found in the case study, about what responsibilities companies face, and 
about what steps a company should take when faced with the ethical problems. 
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1. Introduction 
Across the world, countries that are rich in natural resources struggle with poverty, hunger, 
disease, and lack of education. These countries should have every qualification necessary to 
become well developed nations, yet poor quality of life is the norm rather than the exception. 
Corrupt governments, poor legal systems, oppression, and nonexistent or poor health care are 
the facts of life for people in these countries. Their natural resources are in high demand by 
the world market, and large multinational corporations (MNCs) operate in the struggling 
countries in order to bring the resources to market. The MNCs bring large influxes of cash to 
the countries, yet this money often fails to benefit the people. 
 
The focus within a struggling resource rich country will be put upon its institutions, as the 
institutions are found to be behind much of the difficulties experienced by the people. The 
term inadequate institution is used. MNCs operating in countries with inadequate institutions 
will face ethical problems with no clear solution. This thesis will research problems MNCs 
face with different ethical perspectives drawn from the three major branches of moral 
philosophy.  
 
This thesis will use a case study of Angola as the basis for the research, a country that 
represents the problems of inadequate institutions very well. This country has a plethora of 
humanitarian problems while being rich in oil and gas. A sample of MNCs present in Angola 
will be researched. Their operations and actions that relate to the ethical problems brought 
about by their involvement in Angola will be outlined. The responsibilities they face will be 
an important result of the research. A comparison of how the responsibilities are handled and 
how they should be handled according to this thesis will find the MNCs’ efforts lacking.  
 
The reason for choosing this subject for the thesis is the author’s belief that the issue needs 
more attention. The oil industry is used as an example in this thesis, and it is telling of the 
challenges faced by the entire world. As oil reserves in the first world dwindle and an 
increasing number of new discoveries are made in the third world the importance of the oil 
industry in countries with inadequate institutions will only rise. The industry is fascinating 
because of the desirability and uneven distribution of oil. Companies that come from 
countries with well developed institutions, providing numerous checks and balances, have to 
conduct their business in host countries with a weak or nonfunctioning institutional 
 environment. In addition to the interesting aspects of the subject, the author believes there is 
room for improvement in how MNCs manage the problems they encounter and is curious 
about what changes can be possible.
 
Much of the thoughts and reasoning in this thesis can be seen in the light of a simple model, 
borrowed and adapted from thesis advisor Andreas Falkenberg:
 
   
         
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of ethics is, in this thesis
model the actors (four MNCs) operate in Angola where they have to work in an enviro
of institutions. First among the institutions are the Angolan Government and the laws and 
regulations issued by them. The actors perform acts that can be evaluated with the help of 
ethics. The end result must be promotion of human flourishing, so if 
promote human flourishing, acts that follow the institutions are not ethical or morally right. A 
company that devotedly follows laws and regulations in a host country is not in the right if the 
laws and regulations are not right. Wi
those who matter the most; the people. 
 
This thesis will first explore what institutions really are, and then what inadequate institutions 
are. Three different schools of moral philosophy will be p
discussion of the problems the MNCs face in Angola. After the presentation of ethical theory 
a case study of Angola follows. The study of Angola will uncover problems that can arise 
 
       Actors          Ethics          Institutions         Promote         Flourishing
 
 
                         
, stated to be promotion of human flourishing. In this 
the institutions do not 
th an ethical perspective one must consider the effect on 
 
resented that will be used later in a 
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because of inadequate institutions. The thesis will then look at how these problems relate to 
the oil companies selected for the research. After that a discussion of the problems will be 
undertaken that draws on the three ethical theories, with examples of what should be done if 
the theories were to be followed fully. Following that a section is dedicated to the resource 
curse, an affliction that many countries with abundant natural resources suffer from. The 
research and presentation of the resource curse is meant to show that the problems found in 
this thesis are not limited to just Angola. Finally, a summary will present what has been 
learned about Angola, about the actions of the MNCs in Angola, and about the problems they 
face, that require careful consideration. Recommendations for MNCs will be the final section 
of this thesis. 
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2. Theory 
In this section a selection of relevant theories is presented that will be used for a later 
discussion of the ethical or moral problems discovered during the research. The term 
institution is defined, and the good that all things seek is suggested to be human flourishing, 
resulting in a definition of what an inadequate institution is. Further on, the three major 
branches within ethics and moral philosophy are presented; virtue ethics, consequentialism 
and deontology, both in their original form and some newer adaptations. In the research of 
ethical theory several different works were studied, yet the theory presented here draws 
heavily on three different writers for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Hursthouse, 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Johnson respectively. This is due to their articles’ excellent summary 
of different perspectives within each school of thought. 
 
2.1. Definition of institutions 
For the purpose of this thesis, it would be appropriate to start with a definition of institutions, 
and furthermore; explain what is meant by inadequate institutions. There is no single, 
generally accepted definition of institution (Hodgson, 2006). It could be useful to look at 
different sources before deciding on how to define the term in this thesis. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) has the following definitions, among others: 
 
“2. a. The giving of form or order to a thing; orderly arrangement; regulation.  b. 
The established order by which anything is regulated; system; constitution.” 
 
“6. a. An established law, custom, usage, practice, organization, or other element in 
the political or social life of a people; a regulative principle or convention subservient 
to the needs of an organized community or the general ends of civilization.” 
(Simpson & Weiner, 1989). 
 
It is uncertain whether social scientists contributed to this entry in the OED, however, the 
dictionary is considered somewhat of an authority on the English language. 
 
Nobel laureate Douglass North uses another definition in his work: 
 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” 
 (North, 1990, p. 3). 
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Yet another definition can be drawn from Geoffrey Hodgson: 
 
“…we may define institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules that 
structure social interactions. Language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, 
table manners, and firms (and other organizations) are thus all institutions.” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 2). 
 
John R. Commons, an early contributor to the theory of institutional economics, gave the 
following definition, after discussing the difficulties of defining the term: 
 
“If we endeavor to find a universal circumstance, common to all behavior known as 
institutional, we may define an institution as collective action in control, liberation 
and expansion of individual action.” 
(Commons, 1931, p. 649). 
 
Although different, a common theme can be found in these definitions, the idea of structure, 
regulation, and control. These related terms give a sense of the purpose of institutions. By 
constraining human behavior and interaction, institutions serve to promote some ends in a 
society. The word constraints may have negative connotations, but in this case the function of 
the constraints is not necessarily to restrain the society. “Institutions both constrain and enable 
behavior. The existence of rules implies constraints. However, such a constraint can open up 
possibilities: it may enable choices and actions that otherwise would not exist” (Hodgson, 
2006, p. 2). Exampled used by Hodgson include the rule of law, that can increase personal 
safety, and the rules of language, that allow people to communicate. Williamson emphasizes 
the importance of institutions in determining transaction costs (Williamson, 1987), a view 
supported by North (1991). The security of property and contractual rights is brought up by 
Keefer and Knack when researching the differences in economic growth between poor and 
wealthy countries with an institutional perspective (Keefer & Knack, 1997).  
 
These characteristics of institutions can improve market efficiency, which in turn can 
facilitate growth. But this is not always the case. “Institutions are not necessarily or even 
usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to 
serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules” (North, 1997, p. 
20). Institutions that do not promote efficiency are relevant for this thesis, as the meaning of 
inadequate institutions is explored. It seems prudent to assume that efficiency, for a society as 
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a whole, is desirable. If we consider the needs of a society as the basis for evaluating 
institutions, then institutions that serve the interests of a small group within the society, at the 
expense of the whole society, should be considered inadequate. Keefer and Knack (1997) 
employ various indicators of institutional quality in their research, including “measures of the 
prevalence of the rule of law, the pervasiveness of corruption, and the risk of expropriation 
and contract repudiation”. A low score on the rule of law, and a high score on corruption, risk 
of expropriation and contract repudiation would point to a country having inadequate 
institutions.  
 
If a single definition of institutions is needed, Douglass North’s seems like the best, so this 
thesis will use his definition, and elaborate on the term humanly devised constraints as 
needed. It is worth noting that North makes no mention of any good that institutions are 
created for, only their neutral function. More information is needed to determine what good 
this could be. 
  
2.2. Human flourishing 
To take the search for a definition of inadequate institutions one step further, this thesis will 
borrow from virtue ethics the concept of eudaimonia, which can be translated as either 
happiness or flourishing (Hursthouse, 2008). The problem with happiness as a translation is 
that the state of being happy is subjectively determined. Using flourishing could also be 
problematic, because it can apply to animals and plants, but eudaimonia is only possible for 
rational beings (Hursthouse, 2008). To rectify that drawback the concept can be qualified as 
human flourishing.  
 
The concept comes from Aristotle, who said that “every art and every investigation, and 
likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good” (Aristotle, 1999, 
p. 3). Aristotle goes on to explain that some ends are more desirable than others since some 
ends are only pursued for the sake of other ends. An example of this could be security of 
property rights. While security of property rights is an end, it is not pursued for the sake of 
itself, but for lower transaction costs, which in turn leads to increased investments and 
economic activity. In the same way, increased economic activity is an end pursued for the 
sake of another end, that of increased wealth or welfare. So the argument continues. Aristotle 
searched for the highest good or the ultimate end, which was desirable for itself, not desirable 
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for the sake of some other good, and all other goods were desirable for its sake (Kraut, 2008). 
In the (translated) words of Aristotle himself: 
 
“If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for 
its own sake, while we wish the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose 
everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process 
ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one 
ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good.”  
(Aristotle, 1999, p. 5). 
 
The ultimate end was determined to be eudaimonia, or human flourishing. Aristotle said that 
most people agreed with this definition of the highest good, but they disagreed about what 
human flourishing really was (Aristotle, 1992). He dismissed the idea that pleasure, honor or 
wealth were the main components of human flourishing. He asks what the function of a 
human being is, and goes on to argue that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul 
in accordance with virtue (Kraut, 2008). Human flourishing, then, is not a state or condition, 
but a life of activities; doing something that expresses virtue. Although human flourishing is 
an end to pursue for itself, Aristotle recognizes that without an adequate supply of other goods 
the virtuous activities can be impeded (eudaimon translated to happiness in this quote):  
 
“... Hence the happy person needs to have goods of the body and external goods 
added to good activities, and needs fortune also, so that he will not be impeded in 
these ways. Some maintain, on the contrary, that we are happy when we are broken on 
the wheel, or fall into terrible misfortunes, provided that we are good. Willingly or 
unwillingly, these people are talking nonsense” 
 (Aristotle, 1992, p. 334). 
 
Friends, family, health, wealth and power are examples of other goods that one must possess 
in order to flourish through virtuous activities. Lack or traumatic loss of these goods will be a 
deterrent to living well, or flourishing. Aristotle says this is why some people identify 
flourishing with good fortune (Aristotle, 1992). 
 
Human flourishing as a description of “the highest good” or a good life can be applied to all 
moral theories, not just those originating from Aristotle’s work. This thesis will use human 
flourishing as the stated purpose of institutions, and as an ultimate end to the different views 
on moral philosophy presented. With human flourishing as the basis of institutions it is 
possible to define inadequate institutions as institutions that do not pursue or further human 
flourishing. It is important to note that it is all of humanity that is meant to flourish, not just a 
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select group of people. An example is given by Aristotle: “constitutions which aim at the 
common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only 
at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which 
is inappropriate for a community of free persons” (Miller, 2008). 
 
2.3. Virtue ethics 
Virtue ethics is one of three major perspectives within the domain of normative ethics. It 
originated from Greek moral philosophy, with the famous philosophers Plato and Aristotle 
being the founding fathers (Hursthouse, 2008). Virtue ethics centers on the actor performing 
an action, not the action itself. The character of the actor is seen as the basis for ethical 
thinking. An actor can possess virtues that allows for morally “right” actions. Virtue ethicists 
are skeptical to draw conclusions about what is morally right based on a single specific action.  
 
Honesty could be an example of a virtue, but it is more than just a tendency to do what is 
honest. A virtue is a disposition that is well entrenched in its possessor; and a disposition that 
is related to many actions beyond just the tendency to do what is honest. Emotions, emotional 
reactions, choices, values, desires, attitudes, interests, expectations, and sensibilities are part 
of the virtue (Hursthouse, 2008). Hursthouse writes that “to possess a virtue is to be a certain 
sort of person with a certain complex mindset” (2008, p. 2). An important aspect of this 
mindset is the recognition that a range of considerations can be the reason for a certain action. 
For example, a person that never lies or cheats out of fear of being caught and the following 
repercussions cannot be said to be an honest person. An honest person chooses to never lie or 
cheat because he or she recognizes that it is wrong and values honesty. The virtue plays a part 
in many aspects of the honest person’s life. Hursthouse has another example: 
  
“Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, 
to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, 
dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or 
pities those who succeed by dishonest means rather than thinking they have been 
clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked 
or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on”  
(Hursthouse, 2008, p. 2). 
 
For a person to fully possess such a disposition is rare. Most people would have some minor 
or major shortcomings that will detract from the ideal disposition. A person who acts honestly 
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in most dealings with other people could be prone to arrogance towards some subgroup of a 
community, thus falling short of the perfect virtue. Possessing a virtue, then, is a matter of 
degree. Virtue ethicists draw a distinction between perfect virtue and “continence” or self-
restraint. The perfectly virtuous act virtuously without an internal struggle against contrary 
desires, while the continent must control a desire or temptation to do something other than 
what is virtuous (Hursthouse, 2008). In most people’s minds, somebody who do the right 
thing when it is very hard for them to do so are worthy of admiration. An example could be 
someone who returns a lost wallet, full of money, when they themselves are destitute. In the 
example the circumstances make it hard for the actor to act morally, and the virtuous act is 
admirable. However, if the moral struggle was caused by a flaw in the character of the actor, 
like an inclination to steal from others, then the act is not worthy of admiration. Here virtue 
ethics differs from other moral theories, in particular consequentialism, in the way that the 
moral “quality” of an act is judged on the basis of the actor’s mental disposition. In 
consequentialist theory the motivations of the actor would not be central, rather the act itself 
and its’ ramifications.  
 
If the actor was an MNC its disposition would be the aggregate of all the dispositions of all 
the members of the organization, which can be referred to as the organizational culture. 
Imagine a company, operating in a developing country, who is offered a valuable input factor 
in their production at a greatly reduced price. The goods are offered by a local militia, and the 
reason for the low price is likely to be that they are stolen. If the company is of a virtuous 
nature, every member of the organization would immediately and forcefully reject such an 
offer. If on the other hand, the offer by the local militia was carefully considered and debated 
and the only reason why the company did not act on the opportunity was the company’s fear 
of a media scandal, then a rejection of the offer is not considered morally right. 
 
Aristotle argued that virtues were related to feelings such as appetite, anger, fear, confidence, 
joy, love, hate and so on (Aristotle, 1992). For humans it is possible to have feelings in excess 
or deficiency, and both states were seen as wrong. “Now virtue is concerned with feelings and 
actions, in which excess and deficiency are in error and incur blame, while the intermediate 
condition is correct and wins praise, which are both proper features of virtue. Virtue, then, is a 
mean, in so far as it aims at what is intermediate” (Aristotle, 1992, p. 255). An example could 
be courage; where deficiency in courage could be called cowardice and excess of courage 
could be called foolhardiness. Another example here is modesty, which lies between 
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bashfulness (a deficiency) and vanity (an excess). The virtue state will be found somewhere 
between the two extremes, but not necessarily at the exact midpoint. Achieving this state is 
difficult, because there is only one correct way, and many wrong. 
 
To be fully virtuous one needs practical wisdom (Greek: phronesis) in addition to the 
inclination to do what is right. Practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that 
enables its possessor to do the right thing in any given situation. This is what sets adults apart 
from children and adolescents. Children may have the inclination to do good, but they may be 
ignorant of what they need to know in order to do what they intend (Hursthouse, 2008). 
Practical wisdom can only come from life experience. Knowing what is important in every 
situation, what is relevant and worthwhile, is part of practical wisdom. A person with this 
knowledge knows how to live well, and in Aristotelian tradition is claimed to have a true 
grasp of eudaimonia, or human flourishing (Hursthouse, 2008). For MNCs then, it is 
important that they fully understand the conditions of a country they enter, and the 
relationships between different parties, regulated by institutions, and how these affect human 
flourishing in that country. 
 
Living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for human flourishing. Aristotle suggests a 
number of virtues to pursue. In an effort to make his ethical theory applicable to all people, 
across culture lines, he identified spheres of experience within a human life that were 
common to all and their corresponding virtues. The spheres and virtues have been 
summarized by Nussbaum in the following presentation: 
 
 
      Sphere Virtue 
 
1. Fear of important damages, esp. death 
 
Courage 
2. Bodily appetites and their pleasures Moderation 
3. Distribution of limited resources Justice 
4. Management of one’s personal property, where 
others are concerned 
Generosity 
5. Management of personal property, where hospitality 
is concerned 
Expansive hospitality 
6. Attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth Greatness of soul 
7. Attitudes to slights and damages Mildness of temper 
8. Association and living together and the fellowship of 
words and actions 
a. Truthfulness in speech 
 
 
Truthfulness 
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b. Social association of a playful kind 
 
 
 
c. Social association more generally 
 
 
 
9. Attitude to the good and ill fortune of others 
 
 
 
10.  Intellectual life 
 
 
 
11. The planning of one’s life and conduct 
Easy grace  
(contrasted with 
coarseness,  
rudeness, insensitivity) 
Nameless, but a kind of 
friendliness (contrasted 
with irritability and 
grumpiness) 
Proper judgment  
(contrasted with 
enviousness, 
spitefulness, etc.) 
The various intellectual 
virtues, such as  
perceptiveness, 
knowledge, etc. 
Practical wisdom 
(Nussbaum, 1993, p. 246). 
 
A common criticism of virtue ethics is that different cultures have different perceptions of 
what is virtuous (Hursthouse, 2008). This relates to the debate between relativism and 
universalism. One statement from moral relativism is “The truth or falsity of moral 
judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, 
convictions, or practices of a group of persons” (Gowans, 2008).  If the virtues differ, it can 
be claimed that virtue ethics fail to produce a model of ethics that could be adopted by the 
whole of mankind.  
 
A response to this is that “everyone makes some choices and acts somehow or other in these 
spheres: if not properly, then improperly” (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 247). Nussbaum further 
explains that everyone will have some attitude and corresponding behavior towards the 
different spheres of experience. Having attitudes to our own death, our bodily appetites, our 
property and its use, distribution of social goods, kindness to others, and so on is part of every 
human life. Given that this is true, one’s behavior will fall within the spheres of experience 
presented by Aristotle (Nussbaum, 1993). The behavior can be either appropriate or 
inappropriate, but it will be within the spheres. What acts are appropriate will be a matter of 
disagreement, unsurprisingly, but people will be arguing about the same thing; they will argue 
about different specifications of the same virtue (Nussbaum, 1993). The virtue term will be 
grounded in the sphere of experience with an approximate definition of “whatever being 
disposed to choose and respond well consists in, in that sphere” (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 247). 
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The task of ethical theorists will be to search for the best specifications that follow the 
approximate definition to produce a full definition. In this way, virtue ethics allows for some 
cultural sensitivity. The virtues are not relative to culture, but local understanding changes the 
interpretation of them. Some of the virtues will be more open for interpretation, for example 
greatness of soul, which is a Greek way of looking at one’s own worth. This will be distinctly 
different from a modern Christian view on self worth. The conflict is, however, confined if we 
regard them as two rival specifications of the same underlying question; the proper attitude 
towards the question of one’s own worth (Nussbaum, 1993). Later in the thesis several 
problems that are common to many countries with natural resource abundance will be shown. 
The similarity in the ethical challenges between countries with different cultures, coupled 
with the common spheres of experience, indicate that universal ethics do serve a purpose. 
  
Another criticism is directed at the spheres of experience in the Aristotelian approach. Critics 
argue that there is no uninterpreted, “given” experience (Nussbaum, 1993). Any experience 
will be interpreted by a person, and that action will be influenced by his or hers culture; 
beliefs, teachings, language and norms. For example the fear of death has been found to vary 
between groups of people at different times and different places. How bodily appetites are 
viewed has also changed from ancient times to the present day (Nussbaum, 1993). Because 
there is no shared experience as a foundation, the whole ethical approach is moot. 
 
In response to this, Nussbaum first agrees that “with respect to any complex matter of deep 
human importance there is no ‘innocent eye’, no way of seeing the world that is entirely 
neutral and free of cultural shaping” (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 260). She also concedes that the 
grounding spheres of experience will not provide a single, language-neutral foundation on 
which an account of virtue can be based without problems. The critics, labeled relativists, are 
said to understate the amount of commonness across cultures, especially within the areas of 
the spheres of experience. Even though there are apparent differences in how people interpret 
these, we can recognize the experiences of people from other cultures as similar to our own 
(Nussbaum, 1993). The original list of aspects of a human life, the spheres of experience 
presented by Aristotle, may be too specific to be universally applied. Nussbaum suggests 
another list of features of our common humanity, to base further debates on: 
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Common feature  
 
1. Mortality 
 
All humans face death and are aware that they are facing it. This 
shapes every aspect of human life. 
 
2. The body All humans have bodies with the same basic biological needs. 
 
3. Pleasure and pain All cultures have a conception of pain which largely overlap with 
one another. Humans are normally able to experience this, likely 
before any cultural influence. 
 
4. Cognitive 
capability 
The claim “All human beings by nature reach out for 
understanding” by Aristotle seems to hold. This is a likely 
common aspect of humanity, however much it is later shaped by 
one’s culture. 
 
5. Practical reason All human beings, whatever their culture, try to plan and manage 
their lives, asking and answering questions about how one should 
live and act. A being who altogether lacked this capability would 
not be likely to be acknowledged as a human being in any culture. 
 
6. Early infant 
development 
All humans begin as hungry babies, perceiving their own 
helplessness, their alternating closeness to and distance from those 
on whom they depend, and so forth. Experiences of desire, 
pleasure, loss, one’s own finitude, perhaps also of envy, grief and 
gratitude. 
 
7. Affiliation Human beings feel a sense of fellowship with other human beings. 
Friendship and love may have varied conceptions across cultures, 
but they are all overlapping expressions of the same family of 
shared human needs and desires. 
 
8. Humor Nothing is more culturally varied than humor, yet some humor 
and play seems to be a need of any human life. 
 
(Nussbaum, 1993, pp. 263-264) 
 
This list is meant as starting point for further discussion about what the human good is. It 
could be further developed by adding or subtracting items. With universal areas of human 
experience as our focus we can easier reflect on cross-cultural ethical questions. Shared 
experiences lead to shared challenges and problems; even though the way problems are 
handled differs greatly, the issues can be found in any culture. Because of this there is no 
reason for an MNC to ignore ethical problems in a foreign country, citing cultural differences 
as the reason.  
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2.4. Consequentialism 
Consequentialism in moral philosophy holds that “whether an act is morally right depends 
only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive 
behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.”(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 
1). The typical example of consequentialism is utilitarianism, advocated by Jeremy Bentham, 
John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick. Classic utilitarianism could also be defined as 
hedonistic act consequentialism, where “act consequentialism is the claim that an act is 
morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount 
of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any 
incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion.” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 1). 
Hedonism claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only intrinsic bad. 
Together, these philosophical views imply that an act is morally right if and only if that act 
causes the “greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). 
Exemplified; breaking a promise is morally wrong if the act will make other people unhappy, 
rather than the act being wrong itself.  
 
Classic utilitarianism is a combination of many distinct claims about the moral rightness of 
acts, some of which are presented here: 
 
Designation Claim 
Consequentialism Whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences  
(as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the 
act or anything that happens before the act). 
 
Actual consequentialism Whether an act is morally right depends only on the actual  
consequences (as opposed to foreseen, foreseeable, intended, 
or likely consequences. 
 
Direct consequentialism Whether an act is morally right depends only on the 
consequences of that act itself (as opposed to the 
consequences of the agent’s motive, of a rule or practice that 
covers other acts of the same kind, and so on). 
 
Evaluative consequentialism Moral rightness depends only on the value of the 
consequences (as opposed to other features of the 
consequences). 
 
Hedonism The value of the consequences depends only on the pleasures 
and pains in the consequences (as opposed to other goods, 
such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on). 
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Maximizing 
consequentialism 
Moral rightness depends only on which consequences are best 
(as supposed to satisfactory or an improvement over the 
status quo). 
 
Aggregative 
consequentialism 
Which consequences are best is some function of the values 
of parts of those consequences (as opposed to rankings of 
whole worlds or sets of consequences). 
 
Total consequentialism Moral rightness depends only on the total net good in the 
consequences (as opposed to the average net good per person). 
 
Universal consequentialism Moral rightness depends on the consequences for all people 
or sentient beings (as opposed to only the individual agent, 
present people, or any other limited group). 
 
Equal consideration In determining moral rightness, benefits to one person matter 
just as much as similar benefits to any other person (all who 
count count equally). 
 
Agent-neutrality Whether some consequences are better than others does not 
depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the 
perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer). 
 
(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 2) 
 
These claims are logically independent of each other, so one could accept some of them and 
not others. Classic utilitarians accepted all of them. Developments in the field have led to a 
number of moral theories, descending from classic utilitarianism, that have dropped one or 
more of the original claims (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). To separate the descendant theories 
from classic utilitarianism, they are often called consequentialism, a term coined by 
Anscombe (1958). 
 
If one is to choose the action that maximizes the utility of all beings considered, one needs a 
definition of what is really good; what “utility” consists of. Classic utilitarians followed 
hedonism, equaling utility with pleasure. The use of pleasure as the only thing worth pursuing 
has drawn much criticism. Bentham said that simple gambling games were as good as poetry 
if they created as much pleasure (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Objectors claimed this lowered 
the value of human life. In defense, Mill argued that “higher” pursuits would produce more 
intense and durable pleasures, thus being superior (Brink, 2008). Critics also remarked that 
not all pleasures are valuable, for example the pleasure of the sadist inflicting pain upon 
others. Another angle is the claim that not only pleasures are intrinsically valuable, things like 
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knowledge or freedom have value independently of whether they lead to pleasure or avoid 
pain (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).  
 
An alternative to hedonism is pluralism, a theory of value which takes into account more than 
pleasure and pain. Examples can be the intrinsic value of beauty, truth, friendship, love, 
freedom, ability, or life (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Pluralism allows the utilitarian to respond 
to problems such as “lying is not wrong if it causes no pain or loss of pleasure” with the claim 
that lying or untruthfulness is instrumentally bad. With an assortment of values it will be 
necessary to weigh or rank each value against the others, in order to determine the action with 
the best consequences. This is often difficult and some consequentialists hold that certain 
values are impossible to compare with each other (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). If we use a 
pluralistic approach it is possible to include human flourishing as an aspect of utility, of what 
the good is. 
 
In classic utilitarianism, the moral rightness of an act is dependent on its actual consequences 
for all people for all time. The mental task of considering all consequences for all time before 
every act is impossible, but most utilitarians and consequentialists do not intend their 
principles to be used as a decision procedure (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Rather, the total 
utility or value of consequences is considered as the standard of what is morally right. The 
theory can supply the conditions for an act to be morally right, independent of what an actor 
can mentally calculate in advance. It is regularly argued that most people in most situations 
should not try to calculate utilities, because they are likely to make mistakes that will lead 
them to carry out acts that reduce utility (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). However, it is possible to 
believe certain acts reduce utility with a high likelihood, and to avoid those acts, even if we 
have not calculated or predicted every consequence of them. An example could be to kill a 
child. Maybe the child would have grown up to be a serial killer, but it is much more likely 
that he or she would lead a normal life; contributive to society. The act, then, will very likely 
reduce utility and can be classified as morally wrong, in accordance with classic 
utilitarianism. An example from business could be a company that exploits the advantages of 
child labour in their production facilities. The increased utility from the marginally lower 
prices is unlikely to exceed the negative utility of the children’s toil and their missed 
opportunities in terms of education. This practice would then be considered immoral. In many 
cases the negative or positive utility of an act will not be so obvious, demonstrating the 
limitations of our moral knowledge. 
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So far only consequentialism that focuses on the actual consequences has been presented. 
Other approaches to consequentialism maintain that moral rightness depends on foreseen, 
foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Imagine a character, 
John, who lends his car to his daughter, an inexperienced driver. Imagine further that driving 
conditions are very poor that night, with supercooled rain making roads extremely slippery. 
John is not aware of this and a short while after she leaves his daughter gets into a serious 
accident. If foreseen consequences are what matter, then John’s act is not morally wrong, 
because he did not know about the conditions and did not foresee the problems his daughter 
would have. However, if foreseeable consequences are what matter, John’s act is morally 
wrong, because he could easily have learned of the conditions by checking a weather report or 
taking a brief walk outside, and predicted an accident or mishap of some sort, knowing about 
his daughter’s inexperience. We can also imagine that John knows about the road conditions, 
but believes that his daughter will handle the situation well and drive safely according to the 
conditions. If intended consequences are what matter, then John’s act is not morally wrong, 
for he did not intend for his daughter to get in an accident (it will however be morally wrong 
if foreseen or foreseeable consequences matter). If likely consequences are what matter, then 
John’s action is arguably morally wrong, depending on the objective probability of an 
accident occurring.  
 
Once again an example from business can also be used to illustrate the theory. Imagine a 
company that wants to build a plant of some sort in a foreign country. This company hires a 
local contractor to do the work. The local contractor utilizes the cheap labor available to them 
and pays no mind to workplace safety. Imagine a serious accident occurs at the build site with 
multiple fatalities. This accident could have been prevented if basic safety measures had been 
implemented. The question is whether the company’s act to hire the local contractor for the 
job is morally wrong, or in other words, if the company is morally responsible for the 
accident. The company did probably not foresee such an outcome, but it is likely that the 
events were foreseeable. Either the working conditions in the country would be well known or 
they could be easily uncovered through spot checks of building sites. Given consequentialism 
with foreseeable consequences the accident would then be the company’s responsibility. 
According to thesis advisor Professor Falkenberg another way of looking at the term 
responsibility is to use the term response-ability or the ability to respond. In this example the 
company could have put forth HSE (Health, Safety and Environment) requirements to the 
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contractor and followed up with surprise inspections, all at limited cost. Because the company 
did not do so there is a degree of culpability assigned to them. With this perspective an actor’s 
responsibility increases with his or hers ability to respond. Consider a developing country 
where people are starving. A destitute farmer in another developing country has little ability 
to respond to the situation, and as a result has minuscule responsibility. A citizen of a wealthy 
industrialized nation has a greater degree of responsibility. His or hers comparatively large 
discretionary income can be used for supporting different organizations that help the starving 
population. Following this line of thinking, a multinational corporation operating in the 
country where people starve will have an even greater degree of responsibility because of 
their extensive resources, direct contact, and involvement with the country. 
 
Classic utilitarianism has a problem in that it seems to overlook justice and rights (Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2008). The well known utilitarian Jeremy Bentham said the following: “natural 
rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense 
upon stilts” (Harrison, 1995, p. 87). In some cases the moral theory can justify hurting 
innocents if it results in a situation with overall higher utility. A common case used to 
illustrate the problem is an organ donor dilemma. Imagine five patients in a hospital who will 
die if they do not receive an organ transplant, respectively a heart, a lung, a liver, and so on. A 
sixth person is in the hospital for a routine check-up, and it is found that his tissue matches the 
five dying patients. A specialist is on hand to perform the transplants. There is no other way to 
save the lives of the five patients. The doctor also knows that he or she can perform the act 
and keep it secret, avoiding punishment with a high degree of probability. The five dying 
patients will become healthy after the transplant, and the involuntary organ donor will die. 
With a classic utilitarian perspective, the act of killing one to save five seems to be morally 
right, because the utility of five lives exceeds that of one life.   
 
Different modifications of utilitarianism can be used to respond to this problem. One such 
modification is agent-relative consequentialism (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Applying 
consequentialism, a usual process would be to compare the world with the transplant to the 
world without the transplant, and determine which state yields the highest utility. If an 
observer considers the world with the transplant to be better, and the theory requires agent-
neutral evaluation, then the doctor performing the transplant must necessarily make the same 
judgment. If, however, agent-relative consequentialism was put to use, then it could be 
possible for the doctor to come to a different conclusion than the observer. In this case the 
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doctor could find the world with the transplant worse, because he or she would personally 
have to take someone’s life. From the perspective of the doctor, performing the transplant 
would then be morally wrong.  
 
We can introduce another twist to the story to complicate the dilemma. Imagine that the 
doctor was responsible for causing the injuries that are killing the five patients. Agent-relative 
consequentialism would have the doctor weigh five lives against one, all whose death are 
directly linked to the doctor. Not performing the transplant would now be considered morally 
wrong. This result may go against most people’s moral intuition. If we want consequentialism 
to produce the “desired” result, another branch of consequentialism will be required. One that 
fits the bill is indirect consequentialism. Classic direct consequentialism holds that whether an 
act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act itself (from the table above). 
Indirect consequentialism holds that “the moral qualities of something depends on the 
consequences of something else” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 12). “The most common 
indirect consequentialism is rule consequentialism, which makes the rightness of an act 
depend on the consequences of a rule.” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 13). With this approach, 
when evaluating the utility of an act that violates some rule, one must consider what would 
happen if everybody were allowed to violate the same rule. In the transplant case; what would 
happen if every doctor were allowed to transplant organs against the donor’s will? Most likely 
it would reduce trust in doctors, making people fearful of seeing a doctor. People who need 
medical attention may not seek it. In addition, a number of transplants that do not maximize 
utility would occur, as doctors are prone to miscalculating utility like anyone else. If then, “do 
not transplant someone’s organs against their will” was a rule, it would be morally wrong for 
the doctor to violate it according to rule consequentialism, because it would lead to overall 
less utility if every doctor did the same. Exceptions to the rule are not acceptable unless they 
can be granted to everyone, and rule consequentialists claim it is arrogant to think one is less 
prone to mistakes than other people (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).  
 
Classic utilitarianism can be demanding on moral actors. If we look at our everyday activities, 
precious few of them will come close to maximizing utility. Any money we spend above a 
bare minimum required to live could probably be used by people in far greater need than us, 
achieving a higher overall utility. Similarly, any leisurely activity could be claimed wasted 
time or morally wrong when faced with the alternative of helping others, perhaps by working 
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for a charity organization. Watching TV or treating ourselves to something nice does not seem 
morally wrong, yet utilitarianism in its most basic form would suggest so.  
 
A version of consequentialism that addresses the problematic requirement of always 
maximizing utility is called satisficing consequentialism (Slote & Pettit, 1984). This approach 
holds that “an act might qualify as morally right through having good enough consequences, 
even though better consequences could have been produced in the circumstances” (Slote & 
Pettit, 1984, p. 140). With this view, it is not morally wrong to not contribute to a charity if 
one already contributes enough to other charities and if the time and money is spent in another 
way that does create enough good (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Another applicable approach is 
progressive consequentialism, which “requires us to produce a progressively better world 
rather than the best world” (Jamieson, 2007, p. 17). Acts that improve some matter or 
condition to some degree can therefore be considered morally right, even though we are not 
doing the best we can. This makes moral action less demanding (Elliot, 1997). “Both 
satisficing and progressive consequentialism allow us to devote some of our time and money 
to personal projects that do not maximize overall good” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 15). 
 
2.5. Deontology 
Deontological theories stand in contrast to consequentialism, as the morality of choices is 
judged by different criteria than the states of affairs those choices bring about (Alexander & 
Moore, 2008). Some choices are morally forbidden to make, no matter how good the 
consequences will be. A choice or an act is morally right if it conforms to a moral norm. 
Within deontology, Immanuel Kant’s writings are central, and his views will be presented 
here. 
 
Kant believed that the only thing good without qualification was a good will. The meaning of 
good will is related to the idea of a good person, one who only makes decisions held to be 
morally worthy, based on considerations of moral law (Johnson, 2008). Possession of this 
character trait is valuable to all, and in Kant’s opinion something we value without limitation 
or qualification. Without limitation could mean that there is no imaginable situation where we 
would abandon our good will in order to gain something else we desired. Without 
qualification means that a good will is not valuable because it leads to other ends, like 
pleasure or happiness; it is valuable in and of itself (Johnson, 2008).  
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A person of good will makes decisions that are determined by moral demands, also called the 
moral law. These moral demands can be constraints on human desires, so a good will must 
moderate these desires. The motivation is the idea of duty (Johnson, 2008). Other motivations, 
for example happiness, can drive a person to dutiful action, but the action does not express a 
good will and consequently the action has no actual moral worth. Being driven by another 
motivation, the conformity with duty is only happenstance.  
 
Kant argued that our moral duties are based on a standard of rationality he called the 
“categorical imperative”. Immoral actions violate the categorical imperative, and by that they 
are irrational (Johnson, 2008). Imperative means a command, and categorical refers to the fact 
that the imperative applies to us because we possess a rational will. A rational will is 
described as operating on the basis of subjective decision principles called “maxims” 
(Johnson, 2008). A maxim can be exemplified by “I will act in a specific way in certain 
circumstances in order to realize some end”. Being related to an agent, this principle is 
subjective.  
 
Kant has several different formulations of the categorical imperative. The first formulation is: 
 
“Act only in according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law” 
 (Kant, 1992, p. 1013). 
 
With this formulation of the categorical imperative a decision procedure for moral reasoning 
can be made. First you formulate a maxim that incorporates your reason for acting in a certain 
way. Second, you imagine this maxim to be a universal law of nature, governing all rational 
agents, meaning all must act as you propose in the same circumstances. Third, you consider 
whether the maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If the 
maxim passes this test, then, fourth, you ask yourself whether you could rationally will to act 
on your maxim in such a world (Johnson, 2008). Only if a maxim passes all four steps is 
acting on it morally permissible.  
 
An example of a maxim could be “I will make deceptive promises any time it will get me 
what I want”. We can imagine a world where everybody by law of nature tries to deceive 
others to get what they want. However, in such a world no practice of truthful promises will 
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exist. Deceptive promises will not work when there is no tradition of accepting promises to 
take advantage of. This maxim will fail the third step of the decision process, because of the 
contradictions that arise when the maxim is made into a universal law. Another example could 
be a world where a maxim of refusing to develop our talents is a law of nature. We can 
imagine that it is possible to follow the maxim in such a world; the world will be simpler than 
our own, but there are no contradictions and the maxim will pass the third step. However, 
Kant argues that it is not possible to rationally will this maxim to be followed in such a world 
because a rational being will want his talents developed (Kant, 1992, p. 1014). It is possible 
and perhaps necessary to expand this argument. First, Kant claimed that the only end willed 
by all was by natural necessity happiness (Kant, 1992). The meaning of happiness is not 
explained, but we can probably draw a parallel to human flourishing as earlier presented. As 
we all by nature will (or desire) happiness, a maxim that reduces happiness is impossible for 
us to rationally will to act on. If we come to the conclusion that it is necessary to develop 
some talent for ourselves and others as a means to achieve happiness then the maxim of 
refusing to develop talent will be immoral to act on.  
 
As a business example, imagine a company that has found a loophole in the tax code that 
allows them to get away with negligible tax payments on billions of dollars in profit. The 
company might find this a stroke of genius, but if every company in the world were imagined 
to do the same problems become evident. Governments around the world would have 
drastically reduced income, making them unable to provide for people in the way they are 
used to. The loophole would probably be closed for the next fiscal year, but for the current 
year public services would suffer because public sectors like education or health received 
large budget cuts. This world would work; there are no inherent contradictions in a world 
ruled by a maxim of tax evasion. However, a company could not rationally will this to 
happen, as it goes against the happiness of a large number of people reliant on public services. 
Another example could be a company that finds a way to significantly improve the efficiency 
of their production, at the expense of double the pollution or emissions compared to the 
previous production method. With a consequentialist perspective the act of switching 
production methods might be found to increase overall utility in the case of the single 
company, but in deontology the ramifications of doubled pollution by all industrial firms will 
need to be considered. The world is struggling enough with current environmental challenges, 
so a world with double the pollution cannot be rationally willed by any actor.  
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A second formulation of the categorical imperative is called the Humanity formula (Johnson, 
2008) and is stated as follows: 
 
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” 
(Kant, 1992, p. 1018). 
 
The Humanity formula introduces the idea of respect for others that intuitively seems a 
necessary part of moral philosophy. The formula does not rule out using people as a means to 
an end, we use the work of other people daily, but it rules out using Humanity as a mere 
means to our ends (Johnson, 2008). The term humanity does not mean human beings by 
themselves; it refers to the collection of features that make us distinctively human, of which 
our rationality is a prominent characteristic. Consequently, it is permissible to use people as a 
means to our ends if they have made a rational decision to consent to the act, typically 
exampled when somebody performs a service in return for some form of payment. The 
meaning of humanity as an end is not something that we must realize or produce; it is more 
the sense of something we do not act against as we pursue other ends, limiting our behavior 
(Johnson, 2008).  
 
Kant inspired much of the deontological theories that were later developed. Deontological 
theories as a whole hold that some choices cannot be justified by their effects, as earlier 
mentioned.  
 
“For deontologists, what makes a choice right is its conformity with a moral norm. 
Such norms are to be simply obeyed by each moral agent; such norm-keepings are not 
to be maximized by each agent. In this sense, for deontologists, the Right has priority 
over the Good. If an act is not in accord with the Right, it may not be undertaken, no 
matter the Good that it might produce”  
(Alexander & Moore, 2008, p. 4). 
 
For single actors or firms this means that there are certain rules that cannot be broken. If a 
company starts a project in a developing country that somehow takes away the livelihood of a 
group of indigenous people against their will, that act will be immoral, no matter what 
benefits the project might produce for other people. Deontology does not allow for a reduction 
in happiness or human flourishing for some people to gain an even higher increase in human 
flourishing elsewhere. The idea is not to maximize human flourishing, but to avoid acts that 
go against human flourishing. With this perspective there is little excuse to be found for a firm 
 that in one way or another engages in exploitative behavior. The ends do not justify the 
means.  
 
To summarize the theory section 
put forth to help determine the moral character of actors and the moral rightness of acts. The 
importance of human flourishing has been made clear and its relation to institutions and the 
different ethical theories. There are differences between the theories that will be 
evident later when they produce different results in 
be shown to be useful for other types of problems than act
 
 
         
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the theory it is possible to test the relationship between actors or acts 
and the relationship between institutions and human flourishing. Only if both relationships are 
in accordance with ethical theory can an act performed by one of the actors be considered 
morally right. In the case study of this paper the i
promotion of flourishing, and a question will be “now what?”.
 
  
 
       Actors          Ethics          
it can be said that a number of tools and criteria have been 
the analysis. Actor-centric ethics will also 
-centric theories. 
                         
and institutions, 
nstitutions will be found lacking in their 
 
Institutions         Promote         Flourishing
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3. Research Methodology 
The main research question in this thesis is “What problems are MNCs in the resource 
industry faced with when operating in countries with inadequate institutions?”. Supporting the 
main research questions are two secondary questions; “How are these problems currently 
being handled?” and “How should these problems be handled?”.  
 
This thesis will employ an exploratory research design based on secondary data. The 
information collected will be from two main categories; country and companies. The country 
will be Angola, and the focus will be upon the institutions or lack thereof, the living 
conditions for the Angolan people and the practices of the government. The intention of the 
research is to uncover what can happen in a resource-rich country with inadequate 
institutions, or in this case what has happened. The companies researched will be a selection 
of MNCs in the oil industry that operate in Angola; StatoilHydro, BP, Total and Chevron. 
Their current business activities in Angola, their impact on the country, the connection 
between oil companies and conditions in Angola, their view on ethics and responsibility and 
CSR projects undertaken will be researched. By gathering this information, an idea of the 
problems faced by oil companies operating in Angola can be formed. The knowledge of the 
country, the companies, the connection between the two and the problems faced by all will be 
the basis for a discussion, drawing upon ethics theory, about what responsibilities can be 
assigned the oil companies and how they should act with regard to the problems. To support 
the discussion, some ethical guidelines developed by international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) will also be presented. These are guidelines that are made with the 
intent to cover either international business as a whole or the narrower segment of natural 
resource extraction. 
 
Exploratory research design is discovery-oriented and is not intended to test specific research 
hypotheses (Hair, 2003). It is particularly useful when the researcher has very little 
information. Exploratory research is often used to develop a better understanding of a 
problem in order to formulate a research problem to build further research on (Hair, 2003). In 
this thesis’s area of research the relevant issues and the connection between them may not be 
very clear, and the issues or variables are difficult or impossible to quantify. As such, an 
exploratory design seems best.  
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Secondary data are “data that have been collected for some other research purpose” yet “may 
still address the research question at hand” (Hair, 2003, p. 72). Secondary data is both easier 
to acquire and cheaper than primary data. A disadvantage with secondary data is that it might 
not fit the research question or hypotheses precisely, for example by having slightly different 
measures of variables than the research at hand. This would be a serious problem if one were 
doing descriptive or causal research based on secondary data, yet with exploratory research 
the problem is lessened, as there is little focus on measuring variables. Another disadvantage 
more relevant for exploratory research is the difficulty of assessing the quality of the 
information gathered. A researcher must rely on the integrity of the original source for 
assurance that the data are accurate (Hair, 2003, p. 73).  
 
For this thesis, information has largely been collected from reports and statistics developed by 
large NGOs and MNCs. Large organizations like the United Nations, World Bank, World 
Health Organization and International Monetary Fund are in this thesis believed to operate 
with a high integrity in their reporting. Smaller NGOs like Global Integrity, Transparency 
International and Global Witness are also believed to be of high integrity, yet a more careful 
look at their methods was warranted. None of them were found lacking unless specifically 
mentioned. A problem with information about Angola is the taciturn nature of the government 
and the lack of an official census. There has not been an official census since 1970 (USDP, 
2009), making all the statistics about the Angolan population estimates. Without the aid of the 
government some of the information figured out by the NGOs might be inaccurate.  
 
Another possible criticism of the data is that the NGOs have an agenda that could conceivably 
lead them to overreport their findings. This thesis is not predisposed to believe that, but an 
argument can be made as a defense. The exploratory research in this thesis need not rely on 
exact measurements, as no quantitative analysis will be done, the actual real world conditions 
are what matters. An example: in Angola there is widespread poverty. The reported number is 
70% of the people living in poverty. If we imagine that this number was overreported and the 
real number was between 50-60% we can also imagine that it would not really matter. The 
important fact is that there is still widespread poverty, not the precise number. A degree of 
uncertainty in the statistics can therefore be allowed, as it is very unlikely that consensus 
estimates are so far off-mark that the underlying statement (e.g.: “in Angola there is 
widespread poverty”) is false. 
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4. Angola 
Angola is a country in south-central Africa that is found especially relevant for this thesis due 
to its poor institutional environment and mismanagement of oil-generated funds. This section 
will present the research findings, giving an outline of the conditions in Angola with focus on 
the institutions and corruption. The problems faced by the MNCs in Angola’s oil industry will 
be looked at and four different companies will be presented. The companies’ attitudes towards 
the problems and their activities in Angola will be part of that presentation.  
 
4.1. Introducing Angola 
Angola was a long standing colony of Portugal that gained its independence in 1975. 
Following the release from Portuguese rule a civil war broke out between two factions; 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA). The two factions were each in control of a natural 
resource; MPLA had the oil industry and UNITA had the diamond industry (GW, 2002). Each 
faction had the support of several Western countries. This support, coupled with the position 
of power they had in Angola, gave MPLA and UNITA an advantage that is called the 
international resource privilege, defined as “the legal power to confer globally valid 
ownership rights in the country’s resources” (Pogge, 2008, p. 119). Income from natural 
resources allowed the warring factions to purchase arms. Wars are started for a multitude of 
reasons and it is hard to find a single cause, yet it is conceivable that part of the motivation 
was desire of the opposing party’s resource privilege. The civil war lasted for 27 years, ending 
in 2002 after the death of Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA (CIA, 2009). As many as 1.5 
million people may have lost their lives in the war, and 4 million were displaced from their 
homes.  
 
As of 2008, Angola’s population was estimated to be 16.8 million (IMF, 2009). With a total 
GDP of $108.293 billion in 2008 (PPP-adjusted), the GDP per capita was around $6 400 
(IMF, 2009); ranking Angola as a middle-income country compared to the rest of the world. 
However, in 2003 an estimated 70% of the population lived in poverty (CIA, 2003). This 
implies a large degree of income inequality. Poverty is generally measured by the number of 
people living on less than $1 or $2 a day, although it is not clear which measure has been used 
by the CIA in their estimate (most likely $2). For 2008 the national budget was estimated to 
reach $28.784 billion in public expenditure (CEIC, 2008, p. 24). In other words, government 
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spending comes out to around $1 700 per capita. The juxtaposition of this number and the fact 
that 70% of the population live on less than $365-$730 a year is telling of the disparities in 
income and, more importantly; income distribution. The most used measure for income 
equality is the Gini coefficient, which measures countries on a scale from 0 to 1 where 0 is 
perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality. Angola receives a score of 0.64 or 64% which is 
among the highest scores worldwide (OECD, 2008).  
 
Angola is ranked very low on United Nations Human Development Index; with a score of 
0.484, giving a rank of 157th of a total of 179 countries (UNDP, 2008a). Angola scores 
especially low in the area of life expectancy; with an average life expectancy of 42.1 years for 
a child born in 2006 (only Zambia and Swaziland have a lower life expectancy). This is likely 
to be closely related to the infant mortality rate, of which Angola has the highest in the world. 
For every 1 000 children born, an average of 180.21 children die before the age of 1 (CIA, 
2009). Access to health care is unavailable for 60-70% of the population and up to 40-50% 
suffers from chronic malnutrition (WHO, 2005). 
 
4.2. Corruption 
Angola suffers from widespread corruption in its government. The international NGO 
Transparency International publishes an index each year of perceived corruption in countries 
around the world. In 2008 Angola received a score of 1.9 (on a scale of 1-10), ranking the 
country in a shared 158th place out of 180 total in terms of perceived corruption (TI, 2008a). 
A low score means a high degree of perceived corruption, resulting in a low country rank 
(worst is Somalia with a 1.0 score and rank 180
th
 of 180 total). The Corruption Perceptions 
Index is an aggregate of other third-party studies and as such has drawn criticism for being 
inaccurate. The problem is different methodologies and different conceptions of the term 
corruption between countries, and as contributors to the index are dropped and added, the 
score can change from year to year when little has changed in the country being researched. 
This thesis will not use the corruption score as a means of directly comparing Angola to other 
countries, merely to point out that there is a problem with corruption in Angola. 
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4.3. Institutions in Angola 
The institutional framework in Angola affects corruption in a major way. The degree to which 
government officials can be held accountable for their actions and the degree to which people 
are treated equally by the justice system are but some examples of institutions affecting 
corruption. Another international NGO concerned with corruption is called Global Integrity. 
Global Integrity focuses on formal institutions, governance structures and anti-corruption 
measures in their research. Unlike Transparency International they do not utilize third-party 
studies, their results come from in-depth studies and assessments by local researchers and 
journalists (GI, 2009). Global Integrity’s intent is not to measure corruption, as that is 
notoriously difficult on account of the hidden nature of most corruption. They focus instead 
on anti-corruption and good governance institutions, mechanisms and practices. Their results, 
then, are not an indicator of actual corruption, but more a measure of to what degree the 
institutional environment either impedes or facilitates corruptive behavior. Their findings for 
Angola in 2008 are presented in the following table: 
 
Angola: Integrity Indicators Scorecard (Overall Score: 41 (+/- 0.31) – Very Weak) 
Category I Civil Society, Public Information and 
Media 
53 Very Weak 
I-1 Civil Society Organizations 61 Weak 
I-2 Media 61 Weak 
I-3 Public access to information 38 Very Weak 
Category II Elections 49 Very Weak 
II-2 Voting & Citizen Participation 80 Moderate 
II-3 Election Integrity 34 Very Weak 
II-3 Political Financing 34 Very Weak 
Category III Government Accountability 10 Very Weak 
III-1 Executive Accountability 4 Very Weak 
III-2 Legislative Accountability 8 Very Weak 
III-3 Judicial Accountability 13 Very Weak 
III-4 Budget Processes 15 Very Weak 
Category  
IV 
Administration and Civil Service 25 Very Weak 
IV-1 Civil Service Regulations 17 Very Weak 
IV-2 Whistle-blowing Measures 0 Very Weak 
IV-3 Procurement 18 Very Weak 
IV-4 Privatization 66 Weak 
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Category V Oversight and Regulation 53 Very Weak 
V-1 National Ombudsman 46 Very Weak 
V-2 Supreme Audit Institution 60 Weak 
V-3 Taxes and Customs 67 Weak 
V-4 State-Owned Enterprises 35 Very Weak 
V-5 Business Licensing and Regulation 57 Very Weak 
Category VI Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law 57 Very Weak 
VI-1 Anti-Corruption Law 78 Moderate 
VI-2 Anti-Corruption Agency 37 Very Weak 
VI-3 Rule of Law 59 Very Weak 
VI-4 Law Enforcement 52 Very Weak 
(GI, 2008d) 
 
Global Integrity awards Angola with an overall score of 41 out of a possible 100, which is 
explained as being “very weak”. Of the 90-odd countries Global Integrity has assessed only 
Somalia achieves a lower score. The full study results can be found in the appendix. More 
than 300 indicators make up the scores in the different categories and sub-categories of the 
scorecard. These indicators combine the study of whether specific parts of an institutional 
framework are present or not with an assessment of how well those institutions function. 
Separating out the scores related to the legal framework would give Angola a score of 56 of 
100, noticeably better than the overall score of 41, while still not being good. However, if we 
look only at scores related to the implementation of the legal framework the total score will be 
26 of 100 (GI, 2008c). While the legal framework is not adequate in terms of regulations and 
laws the more serious matter is how badly the framework itself is applied. We must remember 
that this report does not measure corruption, only the institutional framework or environment. 
The conclusions we can draw from the report is that Angola’s institutions do not adequately 
protect Angolan citizens from corruption. In particular the almost total lack of accountability 
of government officials and leaders is worrying. Instead of acting as a deterrent to corruption, 
the institutional environment acts more as a breeding ground of corruption. 
 
4.4. Government in Angola 
The current government of Angola is led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the 
MPLA. In 1992 a general election was held, where MPLA received 49.57% of the votes and 
UNITA received 40.07% (EISA, 2007). By Angolan law, a winner needs 50% of the votes, so 
a second round of elections needed to be held. Before this was possible, UNITA withdrew 
from the proceedings, refusing to recognize the results of the elections. The civil war resumed 
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shortly thereafter (GW, 2002). After half a year of fighting the war was not going well for 
President dos Santos and MPLA. MPLA sought help from France, but no official support was 
possible due to high-placed supporters of UNITA in the French Government. However, a few 
government officials were able to, in secret; facilitate an arms deal for MPLA. The political 
scandal this eventually resulted in was dubbed “Angolagate” and is fully detailed in a 2002 
report by independent NGO Global Witness (GW, 2002). By the end of 1994 at least $633 
million had been spent by MPLA on arms through the contact provided by French officials. 
Although the trial in French courts is still ongoing, insiders have admitted that the main 
motivation for supporting MPLA was to gain advantages for French businesses operating in 
the oil industry in Angola (GW, 2002). 
 
The armaments purchased by MPLA allowed them to gain an advantage over their opponents 
UNITA. MPLA did not have the cash to pay for the arms at that time, so loans were arranged 
with security in future oil revenues (GW, 2002). Investigations by Global Witness suggest 
that the prices of the arms were heavily inflated, and that the difference between the true value 
and the contract price was used to pay hefty commissions to the deal makers and to officials 
within the Angolan Government (GW, 2002). The loans provided for these arms deals were 
part of a history of oil-backed loans to Angola since the 1980s (GW, 1999). In recent years 
Angola has substantially increased their lending. From 2000 to 2001, a total of $3.5 billion 
was borrowed (GW, 2002) and from 2003 to 2008 a total of $13.9 billion was borrowed (GW, 
2009). Part of this borrowing is likely for refinancing existing loans, but how large a part is 
unknown because Angola does not disclose that information.  
 
4.5. Sonangol 
The loans provided to Angola are not given to the Angolan Government, but to the state 
owned oil company Sonangol. Sonangol plays different and perhaps conflicting roles in 
Angola. On one hand it functions like a normal company; doing business and paying taxes. 
On the other hand Sonangol is responsible for managing the oil resources of Angola, with the 
power to grant international oil companies the rights to extract oil in Angola. In that function, 
Sonangol acts as a fiscal agent for the government, collecting revenues and making 
expenditures on the state’s behalf (GW, 2009). These activities are kept largely separate from 
the official state budget. Sonangol does not disclose its financial information, and while there 
has been an audit performed, no reports of the audit has been made public (GW, 2009). What 
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is worrying is that the public does not know what the billions of dollars borrowed by 
Sonangol are used for. When Sonangol grants concessions to oil companies it is required of 
the company that wins a contract for a particular land area to pay a signature bonus when the 
contract is signed. Sonangol introduced this requirement in 1992 (GW, 2002) and these one-
off payments by international oil companies have dramatically increased throughout the 
1990s. Estimated bonus payments went from $6 to $35 million dollars in the early 1990s to a 
high of $400 million in 1999, totaling $1 289 million for the 1990s (GW, 2002). Investigators 
from Global Witness claim that $400-500 million of these signature bonuses disappeared 
directly into the Presidency to be used mostly for arms purchases (GW, 1999).  
 
4.6. State looting 
Sonangol functions as an unconventional finance system for the government in addition to the 
official budget, with little oversight. The official budget is made public through the Ministry 
of Finance’s website with itemized allocation available, which is good. Unfortunately, the 
process of developing the budget is closed and controlled by the executive (GI, 2008d). The 
only oversight of how the funds are actually being spent is managed by a committee called the 
Finance Committee, which is supposed to have limited oversight into public expenditures. 
This committee is non-functioning due to stonewalling from the government; no reports are 
turned over to the committee (GI, 2008d). Lacking oversight, a large amount of public funds 
has been allowed to disappear. Based on IMF reports from Angola, Global Witness has 
calculated that from 1997 to 2001 an average of $1.7 billion went unaccounted for annually 
from the Angolan Treasury (GW, 2009). During this period the national budget was much 
lower than in 2008, with the highest being $4.386 billion in 2001 (WB, 2007). This means the 
scale of the funds missing in proportion to the budget is very large. Where all of this money 
has gone is not possible to say for sure, but large parts are believed to be inappropriately used 
for perks for government officials or just plain stolen. In their investigations into the 
“Angolagate” arms trade scandal, Global Witness identified an account holding $1.1 billion in 
a British Virgin Islands bank, with two influential Angolans as signatories (GW, 2002). A 
number of comparatively smaller accounts belonging to government officials have also been 
uncovered, several of which were President dos Santos’ private accounts holding tens of 
millions of dollars (McMillan, 2005).  
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While irrefutable proof of specific acts of corruption is very hard to acquire, due to the closed 
nature of Sonangol’s and the government’s dealings, an aggregation of facts and 
circumstantial evidence allow us to come to a conclusion. The high income from oil, the 
widespread poverty, the lack of institutions, the missing funds, the perceived corruption by 
the Angolan people, the overpriced arms deals, the offshore multi-million private accounts, 
and the general aversion to public oversight are all facts that lead us to conclude that Angola 
is ruled by a kleptocracy. A kleptocracy can be defined as a government that seeks to enrich 
itself at the expense of those governed, and this is exactly what is happening in Angola. The 
very richest in Angola hold positions in the government (McMillan, 2005). The main source 
of income for Angola is the oil industry, making it also the main source of income for the 
ruling elite or kleptocrats. Without the oil revenue and loans backed by future oil production 
the current government would not have been able to purchase the weapons that helped keep 
them in power during the 1990s. By Angolan law, the oil and gas resources belong to the 
Angolan people (GW, 2002). The Angolan people have little information available about how 
their resources are being managed and no real influence in the matter.  
 
4.7. International oil companies and problems they face 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) within the oil industry are responsible for much of the 
exploration and extraction of oil in Angola. The Angolan territories that are believed to 
contain oil are divided up into geographical “blocks”. The right to extract oil from each block 
is bid upon by the oil companies and concessions are granted by the Angolan Government 
through Sonangol. It is normal for several companies to form partnerships in developing a 
block, with one company acting as the operator, performing the actual extraction, and several 
other companies holding equity stakes that help pay for development costs (GW, 2002). 
Sonangol is the operator of some blocks, and an equity partner in most (GW, 2002). There are 
three main sources of income for Angola; the signature bonuses paid when a new block is 
auctioned off, the taxes paid on oil revenue by the MNCs and Sonangol’s share of oil 
revenues as a partner in block developments.  
 
A major issue for the international companies is the fact that billions of their dollars are being 
paid to a kleptocracy that is using said money to stay in power. This money rightfully belongs 
to the Angolan people. Normally a government can be counted as a rightful proxy for the 
people governed and their interests, but in Angola that is not the case. These conditions are no 
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secret either, the deep-seated corruption has been reported on for a long time by a variety of 
NGOs and journalists. No company operating in Angola can claim unawareness of this 
problem. Through their business of extracting oil, a government that commits human  rights 
violations (HRW, 2004) is supported. The degree of responsibility faced by the oil companies 
through this relationship is grounds for much debate and will be expanded upon later in this 
thesis. 
 
The first ethically problematic issue is that money is being paid to a kleptocracy. The second 
major issue is that the size of these payments is shrouded in secrecy. This issue has drawn 
even more attention from organizations critical of MNCs in Angola than the first issue, 
perhaps because the critics know how to pick their battles. The Angolan Government has on 
several occasions shown that openness is not in their interest. When the international oil 
companies sign their contracts for a particular block with Sonangol there is always a 
confidentiality agreement included that oblige the oil companies to keep secret the specifics of 
their partnership with Sonangol (GW, 2002). Oil companies are required to deliver financial 
reports in their home country, but most of the major companies publish aggregated worldwide 
payments so that determining exactly how much went to Angola is impossible. One might ask 
why not disclosing payments is such a problem. The crux of the answer is government 
accountability; when the revenues of the state are kept secret from the people it becomes very 
hard to hold the government accountable for their spending (GW, 2002). Most of Angola’s 
income comes from the oil industry, and accurate information about oil revenues will make it 
much easier to track the money going into the Treasury, hopefully preventing it from 
“disappearing”. By not disclosing payments, MNCs in the oil industry are, by involved NGOs 
like Global Witness, held complicit in perpetuating the unaccountability of the Angolan 
Government. 
 
4.8. Guidelines for Multinational corporations 
Large international organizations concerned with such issues as human rights and the fight 
against poverty to mention some have established guidelines for international companies to 
follow. One of them is the United Nations Global Compact, an initiative to promote social 
responsibility and responsible business practices across the world (UNGC, 2008). The Global 
Compact is a voluntary initiative where companies declare their intention to follow the 
guidelines and publish in their annual reports what efforts have been undertaken to do so. The 
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guidelines are presented in the form of ten principles separated into different areas. “The UN 
Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of 
influence, a set of core values in the area of human rights, labour standards, the environment, 
and anti-corruption (UNGC, 2008, p. 6). These principles are: 
 
 HUMAN RIGHTS 
Principle 1 
 
 
Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
Principle 2 make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
  LABOR 
Principle 3 
 
 
Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
Principle 4 
 
the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
Principle 5 
 
the effective abolition of child labour; and 
Principle 6 the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation. 
  ENVIRONMENT 
Principle 7 
 
 
Businesses are asked to support a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges; 
Principle 8 
 
 
undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility; and  
Principle 9 
 
 
encourage the development and diffusion of  
environmentally friendly technologies.  
 ANTI-CORRUPTION 
Principle 10 
 
Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery. 
(UNGC, 2008, p. 6). 
 
Of these principles, the Principle 2 and Principle 10 are perhaps the most pertinent to MNCs 
in Angola’s oil industry. If any of the major oil companies in Angola adopted the Global 
Compact their practices could be found to violate these principles. By agreeing not to disclose 
their payments to a corrupt government oil companies are clearly violating the tenth principle. 
Seeing how businesses are supposed to work against corruption in all its forms, complying 
with a corrupt government’s demands is an overly passive course of action. As for the second 
principle, it is not the suggestion of this thesis that oil companies are directly involved in 
human rights abuses, only that their operations are funding a government guilty of such 
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abuses. The degree of complicity of the oil companies and the strength of the causal 
relationship between oil money and human rights abuses is open for debate. Yet, with such a 
serious issue as human rights abuse, one could ask the question whether any degree of 
complicity is acceptable. The Global Compact would suggest it is not. If so, the fact that 
money from the oil companies helped keep the government in power would be cause for a 
violation of the second principle.  
 
Another initiative to provide guidelines for MNCs is the Publish What You Pay campaign 
started by Global Witness, now joined by a large number of other organizations worldwide 
(PWYP, 2009b). Their main focus is the accountability of governments for the management 
of natural resources. This campaign was conceived of by Global Witness during its 
investigations in Angola. The PWYP campaign calls on “Multi-national, private and state-
owned extractive companies to disclose a net figure for all types of payments (royalties, taxes, 
bonuses etc) made to governments for every country of operation in their annual financial 
accounts, and to disclose to which level of government payments are made” (PWYP, 2009a). 
The reason for this is as earlier mentioned to be able to oversee governmental operations and 
hold them accountable for their spending. This does require some transparency in 
governments also; just knowing the revenues is not enough, so the campaign addresses 
governments as well, asking them to publish what they earn and establish open, participatory 
and transparent budget processes to effectively manage the revenues from natural resources. 
Most of the MNCs in Angola’s oil industry do not fulfill the requirements set by the PWYP 
campaign, as we will find out later. An additional requirement posed by Global Witness in 
their 2002 report from Angola was that the published information about payments should also 
be easily accessible in the host country (GW, 2002).  
 
4.9. A selection of oil companies in Angola 
In this section four different MNCs that operate in Angola’s oil industry will be presented. 
We will take a look at their own ethical operating principles or guidelines and consider their 
actions in response to the problems they face by operating in Angola. The transparency of 
their operations, which relates to the issue of Angola hiding their exact oil revenues, will be 
evaluated. The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities or social projects of each 
company will be outlined, as that can be considered a response to the issue of operating in a 
country with widespread poverty and terrible health care. 
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4.9.1. StatoilHydro 
StatoilHydro is a multinational oil and gas company based in Norway. The company is the 
result of a merger between Statoil and Norsk Hydro, two Norwegian companies that both had 
been present in Angola for a long time. In Angola StatoilHydro is a partner in nine producing 
oil fields, with a total production of 200 000 barrels per day (StatoilHydro, 2009a). 
StatoilHydro provides technical assistance in several of the partnerships, but is not an operator 
in any of them. StatoilHydro’s ethics code of conduct statement proclaims the following 
commitment: “In its business activities, StatoilHydro will comply with applicable laws and 
regulations and act in an ethical, sustainable and socially responsible manner” (StatoilHydro, 
2009b, p. 7). This statement is a very standard phrasing that is present in most code of 
conducts. As such, it is not worthy of much praise unless backed up by actions. Further on the 
code of conduct states “StatoilHydro is against all forms of corruption and will make active 
efforts to ensure that it does not occur in the Group’s business activities” (StatoilHydro, 
2009b, p. 13). An interesting contradiction arises in the ethical commitment statement when 
applied to Angola. The confidentiality agreements with Sonangol (applicable laws and 
regulations) compel the company to keep payments secret, while the company’s commitment 
to act in an ethical and socially responsible manner compels the company to do the opposite; 
disclosing as much information as possible in order to fight corruption.  
 
This contradiction is not really an issue for StatoilHydro though, as Norwegian accounting 
regulations require information about payments to be disclosed in companies’ annual 
reporting. Each of the partnerships StatoilHydro is involved with in Angola is set up as a 
subsidiary company, so each subsidiary has to report on its signature bonuses and tax 
payments (GW, 2002). Noncompliance with accounting regulations in one’s home country is 
not an option, and StatoilHydro does publish its payments to Sonangol and the Angolan 
Government. In its 2002 report, Global Witness commends StatoilHydro (only Statoil at the 
time) for operating to a “far higher level of transparency than the majority” (GW, 2002, p. 
43), although it is remarked that making information available in Norway is not the same as 
making it available to Angolans in Angola. In a later study performed by Transparency 
International, StatoilHydro is presented as one of a few leading oil companies in terms of 
revenue transparency, only beat by the Canadian Talisman Energy (not present in Angola) 
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(TI, 2008b). On their website, StatoilHydro claims to have a commitment to transparency and 
anti-corruption that is anchored in the UN Global Compact (StatoilHydro, 2009c). 
 
StatoilHydro’s CSR activities in Angola include a knowledge transfer program, well drilling 
projects, financial support for mine clearing, HIV/AIDS programs, educational infrastructure, 
and teacher training programs (StatoilHydro, 2008b). Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway 
studied StatoilHydro in Angola, and in their 2008 report they found that half of the 
investments went to water well drilling projects, an area of expertise for the company. 
StatoilHydro expected to spend NOK 15 million on CSR activities or social projects in 
Angola in 2008 (about $2.25 million) (CMI, 2008). For reference, in 2007 StatoilHydro had 
revenues of NOK 15 626 million in Angola and paid NOK 4 412 million in income taxes 
(StatoilHydro, 2008a). 
 
4.9.2. BP 
BP is the world’s third largest multinational energy company, headquartered in London. In 
Angola BP is partner in four producing fields, yielding them 202 000 barrels per day in 2008 
(BP, 2008). Of the four fields, BP acts as operator in two of them. BP has an extensive code 
of conduct published at their website. One of the more interesting and relevant quotes are: 
  
“Our aim is that countries and communities in which we operate should properly 
benefit from our presence – through the wealth and jobs created, the skills developed 
within the local population and the investment of our time and money in people. We 
will work towards improvements that are measurable and contributable to the real, 
independent growth of communities where we operate. We will not engage in bribery 
or corruption in any form. Corruption is the enemy of development and human 
progress, and we are committed to transparency in all our dealings”  
(BP, 2009, p. 46). 
 
Besides pledging to keep their operations transparent, this shows that BP intends their 
presence in a foreign country to be a net benefit to the local communities and population. 
When Global Witness contacted BP in 2001 to ask them about their stance on revenue 
transparency BP responded that they would publish relevant information about their payments 
to Sonangol and the Angolan Government, and that information about a recent deal was 
already a matter of public record (GW, 2002). BP’s response gained a lot of media attention, 
and Sonangol replied with a letter that threatened with termination of contracts if BP 
continued with their course of action. This letter was also sent to the other major oil 
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companies as a thinly veiled threat to all who were considering publishing what they were 
paying (GW, 2002). It is unclear how relations have fared between BP and Sonangol since 
then, but the high standard in terms of revenue transparency set in 2001 may have slipped 
some. In their 2008 assessment, Transparency International gives BP a below country average 
score for oil companies operating in Angola (TI, 2008b, p. 21). Perhaps this unsatisfactory 
score is because BP published aggregated payments to Sonangol and Angola, as they 
announced their intention to do in 2001 (GW, 2002), instead of breaking payments down to a 
per oil field basis. 
 
BP’s CSR activities in Angola include a Masters of Law program, a supplier training initiative 
meant to develop local SMEs, a micro-credit program, different initiatives to support local 
schools, a solar energy project in rural communities, an HIV/AIDS awareness initiative and 
support of a home for street boys (BP, 2006). Costs were not available for all social projects, 
but the cost of the three largest projects totaled $6.66 million. Note that these costs were 
planned to be carried over a period of up to three years. Revenues from Angola were not 
easily available, but it is likely that they are similar to StatoilHydro’s, given their almost 
identical production rates. Tax payments might be different though, as indications are BP is 
investing at a high rate in Angola. The attempt to figure out how much they paid to Angola 
using their website and the reports published there was unsuccessful. 
 
4.9.3. Total 
Total is an oil and gas company based in France. It is the result of two mergers, first between 
Total and PetroFina to create Totalfina, and then a merger with Elf Aquitaine to create 
TotalFinaElf. In 2003 the company was renamed to just Total (Total, 2009c). Total is the 
world’s sixth largest multinational energy company in terms of revenue. In Angola Total has a 
stake in ten different blocks of oil territory. Total is the operator in six of the blocks, and a 
partner in four (Total, 2008). Despite a wider involvement than StatoilHydro or BP, Total’s 
production in Angola is very similar, at 205 000 barrels per day in 2008 (Total, 2009a). 
Revenues from Angola were not easily available, but Total has published a report on their 
website stating their payments to Sonangol and the Angolan, which amounted to $3.9 billion 
in 2007, although this number includes Sonangol’s revenues coming from their share of the 
oil production in the partnerships with Total. The oil revenues belonging to Sonangol as an 
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interest holder in the oil fields likely constitutes much of this number, seeing how 
StatoilHydro only paid around $0.65 billion in taxes on a similar oil production. 
Total, as the other companies, claims a commitment to transparency:  
 
“Oil and gas development generates significant revenues that do not always benefit 
local residents. Total believes that financial transparency is a critical issue and we 
actively support the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) introduced in 
2002. We have also disclosed information on our businesses in certain countries.” 
 (Total, 2009d). 
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative mentioned is a campaign comparable to the 
Publish What You Pay initiative. Total has published a code of conduct in which Total says it 
strives to uphold the principles of the UN Global Compact and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Total, 2009b). In their code of conduct, in a section dedicated to “host 
countries” the following quote can be found: “Total respects the sovereignty of all States and 
refrains from intervening in or funding the political processes” (Total, 2009b, p. 11). An 
argument could be made here that the arms purchases the Angolan Government made with oil 
taxes and signature bonuses in order to stay in power is a political process.  
 
When Global Witness approached Total (then TotalFinaElf) in 2001 to get a response about 
their stance on transparency no reply was made. Total announced in a press release that they 
had turned over information to a study undertaken by the IMF and that they had nothing to 
hide about their business in Angola, yet no information was made publically accessible at that 
time (GW, 2002). In recent years some improvements have been made. Transparency 
International awards Total an above average score for their revenue transparency in Angola 
(TI, 2008b, p. 21). In terms of CSR activities, Total emphasizes their support of local 
businesses by using them as much as possible as suppliers, and their high degree of local 
employees (Total, 2007). Total also supports local universities, although the support is limited 
to geophysics, geology and petroleum engineering programs. Total has created a fund that 
provides low-interest loans to local businesses and it supports an agricultural training centre 
and an institute that trains health care professionals to diagnose and treat sexually transmitted 
infections (Total, 2007). Cost estimates for Total’s CSR activities were not available. 
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4.9.4. Chevron 
Chevron Corporation is the fourth largest multinational energy company in terms of revenue, 
headquartered in California, USA. Chevron was earlier called ChevronTexaco, but returned to 
the name Chevron in 2005. Chevron is involved with three blocks in Angola, two of which 
the company operates. Chevron operates Block 0, the highest producing block in Angola 
(GW, 2002). Chevron had a daily production of 534 000 barrels in 2008, but only 145 000 of 
that belonged to the company (Chevron, 2009). Revenues from Angola and payments to 
Sonangol and the Angolan Government were not available in the annual report and neither 
were they found at Chevron’s website.  
 
Chevron participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as Total does. 
The following statement can be found in Chevron’s corporate responsibility report: 
 
“Chevron believes that public disclosure of payments made by extractive industries to 
governments and revenues received by governments could lead to improved 
governance in resource-rich countries. Good governance contributes to stable, long-
term investment climates and the subsequent improvement of local economies and 
well-being of communities.” 
 (Chevron, 2008, p. 8). 
 
In several reports and statements does Chevron voice their support of transparency and the 
EITI, yet this thesis has been unable to find a stated commitment by Chevron to publish their 
payments. In 2001 Chevron did not respond to Global Witness’ letter about transparency 
following their investigation into conditions in Angola. Transparency International awards 
Chevron a below average score for Angola in their assessment (TI, 2008b, p. 21). 
 
Chevron established a program in 2002 called the Angola Partnership Initiative with the goals 
“to promote peace and stability and improve health and education” (Chevron, 2009, p. 2). 
Additionally the initiative was intended to help reduce poverty through “agribusiness and the 
development of micro, small and medium-size enterprises” (Chevron, 2009, p. 2). Chevron 
made an initial investment of $25 million for a five-year period, and is committed to spending 
$2.5 million a year after the first five until 2012 (Chevron, 2009). During its first five years 
the initiative established a microfinance bank that made loans to 5000 micro/small enterprises, 
helped provide food, seeds and tools to 2 million people and increased enrollment at Angola’s 
Faculty of Agrarian Science in an effort to help “revitalize agriculture” (Chevron, 2009). 
Chevron is involved with multiple programs and projects designed to help local farmers. 
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When Chevron surveyed their progress in 2007 they found that “capacity building of 
government institutions and other local partners is vital for success” (Chevron, 2009, p. 3), 
which corresponds with the premise of this thesis. 
 
4.10. Only one of the issues on the agenda 
Since the early 2000s the issue of undisclosed payments to governments has been put on the 
agenda for international business. Transparency has become a popular word to use by 
companies in different statements like codes of conduct, social responsibility reports and 
business ethics principles. Of the four companies presented, only two provide a reasonable 
degree of transparency; StatoilHydro and Total. All in all, the revenue transparency among 
MNCs is not good enough. “They key finding of the 2008 Report on Revenue Transparency 
of Oil and Gas Companies is that most companies do not sufficiently report on their payments 
to governments where they operate. A limited number of companies do report these payments, 
thereby demonstrating that such disclosure is possible” (TI, 2008b, p. 7). Clearly there is more 
work to be done in promoting revenue transparency. 
 
The other issue has received comparatively little attention, the issue that money is being paid 
to a kleptocracy at all, regardless of disclosure or not. This problem has not been found 
directly referred to by the companies researched, likely because of unwillingness to anger host 
governments. The companies do express that they have a social responsibility in the 
communities and countries they operate in, and all of them are funding or managing social 
projects with goals of improving water supply, health care, education, agriculture, and so on.  
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5. Discussion 
This part of the thesis will be dedicated to a discussion of the presented information about 
Angola and the Angolan oil industry. The discussion will draw upon the theory about 
institutions, human flourishing, virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontology in an effort to 
clarify the problems faced by MNCs in Angola’s oil industry and then to suggest possible 
solutions.  
 
5.1. Inadequate institutions 
Remember the definition of institutions by Douglass North earlier presented: “Institutions are 
the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic” (North, 1990, p. 3). In Angola the institutions were 
found weak, meaning a low degree of constraints for Angolans and most importantly, their 
leaders. In the theory section institutions were determined to be created for some good, and 
that good was the good of all, or human flourishing. Looking at the situation in Angola, it is 
possible to say that the institutions present there do not promote human flourishing. Or, more 
fair perhaps, that the institutions are ineffective in their promotion of human flourishing due 
to a lack of legal and political power. Either way, the institutions will fall under the definition 
of inadequate in this thesis. One of Aristotle’s quotes about human flourishing from the theory 
section is fitting for Angola: “constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct 
and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the advantage of the rulers are 
deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community 
of free persons” (Miller, 2008). The corruption at high levels and the kleptocracy ruling 
Angola fits very well with Aristotle’s definition of constitutions that are deviant and unjust. 
North also mentions that institutions are not uncommonly created to serve the interests of the 
rulers. In Angola there is a disconnect between the government and the people because of the 
lack of institutions. Normally, support given to a government would equal support given to 
the people, but not in Angola. Oil industry MNCs need to deal with the disconnected 
government if they want to operate in the country. This is what brings forth the ethical 
problems for the MNCs. 
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5.2. Virtue ethics perspective 
Virtue ethics is actor-centric rather than action-centric, so in the context of this thesis the 
focus of this discussion will be on the companies rather than their acts. This will involve a 
degree of personification of the companies. Aristotle may not have intended for his theory to 
be applied to organizations, but this thesis believes the application to be useful. In virtue 
ethics the character of the actor is essential for ethical thinking. For a large company like the 
MNCs researched here the character of the company will most likely correspond to the 
organizational culture. Of particular interest are the companies’ values and ethical standards 
and the assimilation of those. For outsiders the best idea of a given company’s values and 
ethical standards can be gained through reading statements about values and codes of conduct 
commonly published on company websites. Knowledge of the assimilation of a set of stated 
values can be very difficult to acquire. Although not centered on actions, the best indicator for 
a company’s assimilation of values in the realm of virtue ethics could be the acts it performs. 
Several of the MNCs researched in this thesis have contradictions between their values or 
code of conduct and the actions they perform. This can be an indicator of lacking assimilation 
of the principles the business is supposed to be run by. 
 
A virtue used as an example earlier is honesty. Honesty as a virtue for StatoilHydro, BP, Total 
or Chevron would mean the company would choose to never steal, lie or deceive because the 
organizational culture believes it to be wrong and believes honesty to be something valuable. 
The most relevant issue with respect to honesty is the transparency of the companies’ 
operations in Angola and their payments to Sonangol and the government. On one hand a 
truly honest company would strive to uphold an agreement made (confidentiality agreement 
with Sonangol), yet on the other hand the truly honest company would recognize the greater 
need of the people to know how their own resources are being governed. Such a company 
would likely never have signed a contract in the first place, as it chooses its partners with care, 
but if it had it should have recognized the disconnect between government and people and 
become fully transparent as a response to the situation. Two of the companies had easily 
accessible information on their websites about payments; StatoilHydro and Total. This does 
not necessarily mean that StatoilHydro and Total are honest companies in the virtue ethics 
meaning of the term. For that to be true they would have to have published their payments 
solely because they believed it the right thing to do, and not out of concern for regulatory 
pressure or negative publicity. When media attention to the corruption in Angola increased in 
the early 2000s StatoilHydro was already publishing their payments while Total did not 
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publish. StatoilHydro was required by the Norwegian government to disclose financial 
information, but this was only available at the Brønnøysund Register Centre in Norway as a 
report in Norwegian. Only later have StatoilHydro started publishing payments on their 
website, in English. To some degree then, both companies have likely been encouraged to 
increase their transparency as a result of outside influence or the anticipation of outside 
influence. Public relations and a good corporate image are good motivators for any MNC to 
change their behavior. All in all none of the four MNCs can be said to possess honesty as a 
virtue in the classical meaning of the concept virtue. As is remarked in the theory, an actor 
that fulfils all the requirements of a perfectly virtuous person is rare. The companies can 
possess a virtue to a degree. Those who do a virtuous act in spite of obstacles are worthy of 
praise, and in Angola the mandatory confidentiality agreement definitely qualifies as an 
obstacle. In light of this, the action of publishing payments to the government is 
commendable. If, however, the greater obstacle was not respect for the confidentiality 
agreement, yet rather an internal unwillingness in the company to expose anything of their 
business regardless of circumstances, then the action will not be praiseworthy. In virtue ethics 
the mental disposition of the actor matters. In a MNC, the mental disposition can also be 
compared to the organizational culture, especially at the manager and senior executive level 
where major decisions are made. 
 
Aristotle wrote that a virtue is related to feelings, and that it was possible to be in excess or 
deficiency of what was virtuous. With honesty as the virtue and MNCs in Angola as the 
actors, determining what is deficient is not difficult; it must surely be the act of publishing 
nothing. Excessive honesty in this case is trickier; perhaps it is the act of unnecessarily 
antagonizing the Angolan Government, for example by distributing flyers in Angolan cities 
detailing their payments. The intermediate option seems to be disclosing relevant information 
in a report published at the company website, as Total and StatoilHydro does. There has been 
no public action taken against these two companies by Sonangol for doing what they have 
done, despite the threats Sonangol made in 2001. Risk of contract repudiation is then no 
longer an excuse for other companies to refrain from disclosing information. 
 
Another aspect of virtue and the pursuit of human flourishing is the need for practical wisdom 
or phronesis. Practical wisdom means the knowledge of how to do the right thing in a given 
situation. The MNCs in Angola have probably increased their practical wisdom in the last ten 
years. Corporate social responsibility and ethics in business has been an increasing trend. In 
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2002, when Global Witness published their report on Angola, Total had not published any 
documents detailing their stance on CSR or ethics at all (GW, 2002). Since then, transparency 
and corruption has entered the vocabulary of all the MNCs. The companies may have learned 
something about their responsibility outside of responsibility to the owners, and the effect 
they can have in the fight against corruption. It is possible that a lack of practical wisdom ten 
years ago made the companies unable to make the right decision. This does not absolve them 
of responsibility for their actions or lack of actions; it means they were incapable of acting in 
an ethical manner (in the realm of virtue ethics). What the MNCs did or did not know about 
the corruption in Angola’s government is hard to tell, but in the present day none can claim a 
lack of knowledge or practical wisdom. The corruption and generally poor governance in 
Angola is widely reported, and several large campaigns or movements have suggested steps to 
be taken by companies and countries, with transparency being the most important. Practical 
wisdom being present, the only thing lacking for a company to become virtuous is the right 
character or disposition. On the face of it, all four MNCs researched have code of conduct or 
other statements of commitment that declare the importance of transparency. The problem 
then must be one of assimilation; that all parts of the organization do not follow the ethical 
principles the company claims to follow. This is directed in particular at BP and Chevron, 
who seem to include transparency as a part of their values and principles, but fail to follow 
through. 
 
Human flourishing in Angola needs to be clarified. Human flourishing means living well and 
living a life in accordance with virtue. For this to be possible in an entire country, institutions 
that protect against violation of rights or injustice seem vital. Human flourishing presupposes 
that people possess goods such as health, food, family, wealth, and power to some degree. In 
Angola most people are lacking several of these goods. This is a big obstacle for human 
flourishing in Angola. For an actor in Angola pursuing human flourishing, as all should per 
the theory, providing these goods to the people should be the first step. One criticism of using 
moral theory popular in one’s home country as a decision guide in host countries comes from 
proponents of moral relativism. Moral relativism holds that what is morally right in one 
country might not be so in another country, due to differences in culture. Now perhaps this is 
true when it comes to judgments based on the more esoteric virtues mentioned by Aristotle, 
like greatness of soul, but the need for basic goods such as health, food etc. cannot believably 
be claimed to be relative to culture. What is morally right is unquestionably to provide these 
goods. In Aristotle’s summary of spheres of experience common for all, a relevant sphere is 
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that of “Distribution of limited resources” where the corresponding virtue is justice. This 
virtue is largely missing in Angola, as vocal opponents of the government are imprisoned 
(McMillan, 2005) and the government is unaccountable for its actions and spending. More 
than any other virtue, justice is dependent upon proper institutions. For the MNCs in Angola’s 
oil industry this means that any measure taken to increase the accountability of the 
government is a move towards human flourishing. Most of the social projects started by the 
MNCs are aimed at providing the basic goods to local communities, so they are also 
promoting human flourishing. Remember though, that in the context of virtue ethics, the 
outcome of a single action is not important, what matters is the character of the company, or 
the internal processes that lead the company to act as it did. Determining whether self-interest 
in terms of publicity or moral standards were the driving force behind a decision is difficult, 
but it is most likely a combination of both for all the companies, making them fall short of full 
virtue.  
 
Nussbaum’s revised list of features common to all of humanity can also be used to 
demonstrate the similarity of people across the world and, following that, the similarity in 
ethics. There is no reason for a company to act significantly different in a host country 
compared to the home country in terms of how they handle ethical problems. Less developed 
countries can often have fewer rules and regulations for international companies to adhere to, 
as is the case in Angola. Yet this should not affect a company’s decision making concerned 
with questions of ethics. When people in essence are the same across the world, the same 
respect should be paid them no matter the country.  
 
It seems then, that for a virtuous company there is no way to rationalize not publishing 
everything they pay to Sonangol and the Angolan Government or in any way impede 
transparency in the oil-driven economy. A virtuous company would aid whenever possible 
with the building of institutions that promote justice and accountability. This covers the issue 
of secrecy around the payments made to the government, but the issue that payments are 
being made at all remains uncovered. Virtue ethics may not be the best tool for this problem, 
consequentialism could be more suitable, seeing how it is action-centric. Suffice to say that a 
fully virtuous company that upheld virtues such as honesty and justice would likely never 
have started operations in Angola at all; as such a company would find a kleptocracy an 
unsuitable partner. Yet, again, such a company or actor is rare. This line of reasoning assumes 
the companies were aware of the kleptocracy when they first entered, which may or may not 
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be true. The MNCs researched likely used local experts or consultants to set up their business 
that were fully aware of the corruption at high levels in the government, which would mean 
that companies that were unaware wanted to be unaware, or that they made no effort to learn. 
This is merely speculation though. 
 
5.3. Consequentialist perspective 
With consequentialism as a tool a better job can hopefully be done of discussing the issue that 
money is being paid to a kleptocracy, regardless of transparency. In order to determine moral 
rightness of an act, the consequences of that act needs to be mapped. The act that is under 
scrutiny is the transaction of money from MNCs to Sonangol and the Angolan Government in 
return for oil extraction rights. If the transaction is regarded with a narrow view no obvious 
problems are found; the Angolan Government is selling a right to extract oil to the MNCs and 
is presumably being paid fairly for it. MNCs get the oil they desire and Angola gets the 
foreign currency they need. The consequence is that both parties profit. This sort of common 
business deal is not immoral with a consequentialist perspective, assuming the negotiations of 
terms were fair.  
 
If the view is expanded however, problems become evident as earlier discussed. The Angolan 
Government is selling extraction rights to oil that belongs to the people. The disconnect 
between government and people means the oil’s rightful owners are being cheated out of their 
proceeds. To make a judgment about the moral rightness of what the MNCs are doing it is 
necessary to explore what options are available to them. Three options that seem evident will 
be discussed here; do as before (maintain status quo), stay in Angola but do everything in 
one’s power to improve conditions and finally; stop paying money to the Angolan 
Government entirely (in effect closing down operations).  
 
 
5.3.1. Maintain status quo 
The first option will involve no changes to what is currently being done, continuing 
production and paying Sonangol and the government with some transparency but not enough. 
The parties that are most affected by the consequences will be the Angolan Government, the 
Angolan people, the MNCs and the MNCs’ customers. To start off, a classic utilitarian 
perspective will be used. Concerning the end users of the oil, the MNCs’ customers, the 1.9 
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million barrels of oil produced daily in Angola (CIA, 2009) are likely to provide a slight 
increase in pleasure. Oil enables people to live a life with personal luxuries that would 
otherwise be impossible. The supply from Angola will exert a downward pressure on the oil 
price, although to what degree is uncertain. The consequences for oil consumers are that they 
can consume slightly more oil, or that they can consume more of other goods because of the 
somewhat lower price. If the principle of diminishing marginal utility is applied, the increase 
in consumption will probably lead to no more than a small increase in pleasure. On the other 
hand, the number of people affected is very large because most countries rely on oil imports. 
For the MNCs the main consequence will be the profits they achieve as a result of extracting 
and selling the oil. The people who work in the MNCs and the owners or shareholders get 
pleasure from the continued profitable operation of their company, either in the form of 
salaries or dividends. The size or value of this pleasure is hard to estimate. For the Angolan 
Government the consequences of continued status quo is that they can continue as before, 
embezzling state revenue and using it to stay in power, with little pressure to change. As long 
as there are MNCs who keep their payments secret it will remain easy for them to embezzle. 
This would bring them some amount of pleasure. 
 
For the people of Angola the consequences are grave. The current situation in Angola with 
widespread poverty, dismal health care, malnourishment and human rights abuses must cause 
a lot of pain for millions of people. To clarify, “pain” in utilitarianism is not necessarily 
physical pain; the term is meant to equate “suffering”. The difficulty here lies in determining 
the strength of the relationship between the MNCs’ operations and behavior and the suffering 
of the Angolan people. At the very least, MNCs who do not embrace transparency can be 
considered a hindrance to reform in Angola and therefore complicit in the perpetuation of the 
people’s suffering. If the history is considered, the MNCs’ operations were found to be 
funding the civil war between MPLA and UNITA, but the war is over and focus must be on 
today’s situation and today’s decision problem.  
 
Classic utilitarianism would have us calculate the total value of the positive and negative 
consequences of this act; maintaining status quo. This value would then be compared with 
other possible acts, acts which are mutually exclusive so only one could be chosen. This is a 
very complex task and utilitarians largely agree that most people are unable to calculate or 
estimate utilities. In trying to calculate utilities in this case, one can see why this observation 
is true. As an example, let us imagine that one billion people gain a minor increase in 
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pleasure, while ten million in Angola live with a major degree of pain as a result of the 
kleptocracy in government propped up by oil revenues. How does one measure and compare a 
small increase in pleasure times one billion with a large increase in pain times ten million? 
Without reverting to speculation this would be almost impossible. Especially the 
measurement of the Angolan people’s suffering seems an insurmountable task.  
 
5.3.2. Cease operations  
The next option that will be discussed is the full stop of payments by the MNCs to the 
Angolan Government, which would entail closing down their operations. With a drastic 
reduction in income there would be a high risk of collapse of the government. In current 
Angola the power players can be kept happy with money; if that money disappears there 
would probably be a higher degree of instability within the ruling regime. Such a shock to the 
economy could also cause mass protests or even uprisings. Considering the fighting President 
dos Santos and MPLA have already done to stay in power, they are unlikely to give up their 
position peacefully. The worst case scenario is another civil war. In reality affairs will never 
transpire this far though. For the act of stopping all payments to work, it requires joint action 
by all the oil companies present in Angola. Without a common governing body for all the 
MNCs a joint action is hard to imagine. If somehow the Western oil companies like the four 
MNCs researched where forced to leave Angola, other companies from the Middle East or 
China would be keen to take their place. These other companies are under little pressure to 
adhere to ethical guidelines from their home country, and in terms of transparency would be 
considerably worse than the Western MNCs currently operating in Angola. One must also 
remember the capabilities the national oil company Sonangol has built up through decades of 
partnerships with the MNCs. Sonangol would likely be able to operate many of the oil fields 
alone. In other words, if for example StatoilHydro, BP, Total and Chevron decided to up and 
quit it would only lead to a short-term reduction in oil revenues for the government. Knowing 
this, the MNCs will need intense regulatory and public pressure from home to even 
contemplate leaving Angola. 
 
This option then, is doubtful to ever be more than a thought experiment. Nevertheless, let the 
thought experiment run its course. The consequences for the MNCs’ customers would be the 
opposite of the previous act discussed; a slight reduction in pleasure for people of all foreign 
oil-reliant countries due to an increase in the oil price. This reduction would only be 
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temporary though, as Sonangol and “replacement” oil companies brought abandoned 
production sites back online. For the MNCs choosing to leave the country the main 
consequences will be financial loss. Loss of future profits, investments made, and jobs results 
in a measure of pain. For the Angolan Government this act will cause them financial loss in 
the short term and a risk of being toppled if the people’s reaction to the news is severe 
enough. If this does not happen the Angolan Government could enjoy an increase in pleasure 
long-term, as they would control a larger part of the oil industry themselves, yielding them 
even higher state revenues. For the people of Angola the consequences are very uncertain; 
they would depend on what happens to the government. If the news of all the MNCs 
abandoning Angola were to reach most of the population it could kindle mass protests and 
perhaps provide an opportunity for pressuring forth some change in government. If the 
kleptocracy was ousted it could lead to a large increase in pleasure for the people, supposing it 
were replaced with something better. That is not necessarily so, the institutions will still be 
inadequate, leaving a potential new regime with free reins. If this process were to happen, it 
would probably involve violence and bloodshed of an unknown scale. Short-term a lot of pain 
would be the result with a chance of great pleasure long-term, provided the new government 
acted in the people’s interest. Most likely though, is the situation were the current government 
remains in power, either through suppressing the facts about MNCs leaving Angola or 
through the use of military force. In that case the consequence for the people will be the same 
conditions as today’s or even worse, that is, suffering and pain.  
 
5.3.3. Evolution over revolution 
The last option for the MNCs to be discussed is the act of remaining in Angola’s oil industry, 
paying Sonangol and the Angolan Government, but contributing in every which way possible 
to improve the institutions of Angola and the accountability of the government. This act will 
require no less than full transparency of the business in Angola. The MNCs would also have 
to utilize other channels available to them in order to pressure the government to increase 
their openness and reform. One way of doing this could be to set requirements for any further 
investments to be made in Angola, citing one’s ethical guidelines and increased shareholder 
interest in business ethics as the reason for the change in attitude. This could work, as there is 
a faction within the government that wants to reform and make Angola more acceptable to the 
international community (McMillan, 2005). Some baby steps have already been made, with 
the publishing of signature bonuses on a few contracts by the Angolan Government. The 
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advantage of reform is the lack of violence or armed conflict. The disadvantage is that the 
effect may be limited when the nature of the leadership does not change. But if increased 
openness allows institutions to grow and strengthen, over time it could force the leadership to 
change.  
 
The consequence for the MNCs’ customers, the oil consumers, will not be any different than 
it is today. That is, a small degree of pleasure coming from the higher consumption Angola’s 
oil allows. For the MNCs there are several consequences. Firstly, a better reputation as 
companies that does try to act according to ethical guidelines. A better reputation helps in 
marketing their products and in attracting new investors. The act of becoming transparent 
themselves is unlikely to bring forth any negative consequences, as StatoilHydro and Total 
are already doing this to some degree, without sanctions being imposed on them. There is 
some risk of negative consequences if the MNCs were to pressure the government too hard to 
increase their openness and transparency. The Angolan Government could choose to impose 
some sort of sanction on the MNCs, yet their actions towards BP in 2001 suggest they are 
more likely to make threats and then let business continue as usual if the company backs off a 
bit. All in all the consequences for MNCs will probably involve more pleasure than pain. For 
the Angolan Government any change is assumed to be painful. Considering the power they 
currently have they should be right where they want to be. For the people of Angola this 
option is not guaranteed to bring pleasure, but it does provide an opportunity for them to 
provoke a change in government. Increased transparency and openness enables them to hold 
the government accountable for decisions and spending. This could in the future lead to a 
better governance system, which could pull Angola out of the humanitarian trough they are in 
now. That would reduce the suffering of the people greatly. 
 
5.3.4. Comparison 
Three different responses to the ethical problem of paying money to a kleptocracy have been 
outlined. Based on hedonism, consequences in terms of pleasure and pain were discussed. 
Little attempt was made to value the consequences as that is considered too difficult in 
utilitarianism. Although we cannot determine exact values of utility, it is possible to estimate 
which direction this utility will take; either positive (pleasure) or negative (pain). Based on 
this some comparisons can be made. Consider the first and last option. If the MNCs chose to 
pursue the last option instead of continuing as before the consequences for oil consumers do 
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not change, the consequences for the MNCs changes slightly in a positive direction, the 
consequences for the Angolan Government changes in a negative direction and finally, the 
consequences for the Angolan people changes in a positive direction. Weighing positive 
consequences for the people against negative consequences for the government is not 
difficult, the people are ever so more important and numerous. Clearly then, the last option 
would be preferable to the first, and if these were the only two options available the last 
option would be the only morally right choice because the total utility is bound to be higher. 
Comparing the option of leaving the country entirely with the option of staying and improving 
conditions is not as easy. Both actions could lead to a regime change. Leaving the country 
entirely could bring about a change quicker, but the drawback is the risk of armed conflict. 
Overall it seems that gradual improvement in transparency, institutions and government 
accountability would have a higher likelihood of achieving a beneficial regime change with 
lower risk. Assuming this is the case, the last option presented is the only morally right action 
to undertake for any of the MNCs researched in this thesis. 
 
With classic utilitarianism based on hedonism it was possible to reason which of the available 
options to the MNCs was preferable because the utility of the oil consumers did not change 
notably between the options. Thus the problem of valuing the pleasure of a billion against the 
pain of ten million was avoided. The utility of the MNCs and the government did change, but 
with a wide perspective they are such minor players compared to the people of Angola, 
numbering just in the tens of thousands most likely. If the problem of comparing utility 
between oil consumers and the Angolan people is to be resolved some modifications to classic 
utilitarianism needs to be brought in. The first step can be to discard hedonism and replace it 
with pluralism. Pluralism allows for a wider set of values to be included in the definition of 
utility. Most relevant for this thesis is human flourishing. The previously discussed small 
increase in consumption for oil consumers was found to yield a small increase in pleasure. If 
the small increase in consumption is regarded with a human flourishing perspective it would 
barely register on the utility scale. Human flourishing requires a certain amount of personal 
goods, but it is doubtful if it requires as much as the one billion consumers from industrialized 
nations already possess. A small increase in goods should not affect human flourishing at all.  
 
For the Angolan people however, the human flourishing perspective will register a very large 
amount of disutility. The living standard of most Angolans is contrary to the ideals of human 
flourishing. Now it is possible to make a judgment about the utilities of the current situation. 
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The net total utility will be negative when human flourishing is part of the utility term. When 
evaluating actions, that action which increases the human flourishing of the Angolan people is 
almost guaranteed to be morally right, no matter the consequences for the oil consumers. This 
is assuming the changes in consumption for first world is not so severe that it falls below the 
unspecified threshold required for human flourishing, but even if all the oil supply from 
Angola were to cease this is unlikely to happen. The observation made here can be related to 
the idea within consequentialism that instead of maximizing utility (hard to calculate) one 
should avoid acts that are believed to reduce utility with a high likelihood, which are a bit 
easier to identify.  
 
The current situation in Angola is found to be one of net total negative utility. Through the 
eyes of consequentialism one can reflect on the decisions the MNCs made when they first 
entered Angola decades ago. Classic utilitarianism holds that only the actual consequences of 
an act matters. In that context, the decision to start operating in Angola was not morally right, 
because the actual consequence was a situation of negative utility. For the sake of argument it 
is assumed that the current situation would not be worse if the MNCs decided back then not to 
enter, something we can never really know. With newer variations of consequentialism other 
types of consequences are used. If the basis for moral rightness is foreseen consequences there 
is a possibility that the MNCs did not foresee or understand what the consequences of their 
act would be, making the act not morally wrong. One could argue that the problems should 
have been foreseen, as the corruption was known, and the problem of governments 
embezzling state funds had been evident in other African countries at the time. If foreseeable 
consequences were the basis for moral rightness then, the act would be considered morally 
wrong.  
 
We abandoned hedonism so that the problem of pleasure of a billion vs. pain of ten million 
could be resolved. If that had not been done, and somehow the pleasure of a billion were 
found to be higher valued than the absolute value of the pain of ten million people, then a 
situation would be created where moral theory is contrary to moral intuition. To solve this 
issue, agent-relative consequentialism can be applied. Classic utilitarianism requires agent-
neutrality, that is, the evaluation process of the actor must be the same as that of a third person 
observer. An observer could find the world where ten million people were exploited to gain 
advantages of one billion people to be better than the world where it did not happen. With 
agent-relative consequentialism a MNC could come to a different conclusion. Because the 
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MNC would have to take part in the exploitation of the ten million people directly, the MNC 
could evaluate the act as morally wrong based on their own ethical guidelines. One could also 
use rule consequentialism, allowing the MNC to imagine what would happen if everybody 
violated some rule. The rule could for example be “do not passively allow injustice to 
happen”. An MNC could imagine the world where everybody violated this rule and find it 
morally wrong to carry through with its own act that would violate the rule. 
 
Finally, from the consequentialist perspective, the problem of always maximizing utility 
needs to be addressed. If an MNC were to maximize utility it would find that every dollar of 
profit would be better spent in aid to Angolans, as their utility per dollar is higher than the 
stockholders’. Pay cuts would also be found morally right, that money would also give a 
higher utility in the hands of the Angolan people. Lower than average wages and no return on 
investment for stockholders seems an unreasonable demand to put on a company. A 
modification of consequentialism that solves this problem is progressive consequentialism. 
With that approach the MNCs would be required to produce a progressively better world 
rather than the best world. This ties in neatly with the earlier discussion about which course of 
action for the MNCs that was preferable to pursue. The decision to stay in Angola and 
contribute in every way possible to improve institutions and conditions is very much an action 
that aims at progressive bettering of the world.  
 
To summarize the discussion from a consequentialist perspective; what the MNCs as a group 
are currently doing was found morally wrong. They need to increase their efforts to produce a 
progressively better world, or in this case a progressively better country. The social projects 
of the MNCs are good, but the MNCs could have a much greater impact through their 
business operations, if they increase transparency and pressure the government to do the 
same. Leaving the country was not found to be the best alternative. When the utility term was 
defined to include human flourishing the importance of the consequences for the Angolan 
people completely outweighed that of the other actors involved. Looking back at the time the 
MNCs first entered Angola, the act of entering was most likely morally wrong. 
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5.4. Deontological perspective 
The deontological perspective is the last major branch of ethics and moral philosophy to be 
presented. With this perspective an act is considered morally right if it conforms to a moral 
norm. Looking at the ethical problems for the MNCs in Angola with deontology requires that 
some maxims are formulated that encompass the actions of the MNCs. In a thought 
experiment that maxim is made a universal law and we imagine what such a world would be 
like and if that world is desirable.  
 
One maxim could be “We will do no more than required by law, even though we know the 
law to be insufficient”. It is not suggested that all the MNCs adhere strictly to this maxim, but 
some of their actions can be seen in this light. Now imagine a world where every person and 
every organization in all dealings with other people did the bare minimum required by law, 
even though they knew that more should be done or something different should be done. A 
world like this would be colder than our own, with vast numbers of people being exploited 
due to poor or nonexistent legal rights. Charity and compassion would not exist, and there 
would be no need for ethics, as everybody would follow the law and no more, making 
reflection on ethical dilemmas useless. In fact there wouldn’t be any ethical dilemmas, only 
legal dilemmas if the law was unclear or contradictory. The next step is to consider whether 
the maxim is conceivable in a world where this maxim is a universal law. In this case it seems 
that the world with this maxim will work, there is no inherent contradiction. The last step is to 
ask oneself if one could rationally will this maxim to be followed in such a world. Here it 
would not be possible to will the maxim to be followed. The world that would be created then 
is objectively worse than our current world, due to a reduction in the supreme good which is 
defined as human flourishing in this thesis. A single MNC could gain from limiting efforts to 
what is specified in an insufficient legal system, but if everybody were allowed to do that the 
world would be worse off. In Angola the institutions are found inadequate, with the legal 
system being one of the institutions. MNCs cannot be content with following Angolan laws 
and regulations; they are called to go above and beyond the legal requirements. For example, 
the law does not demand that MNCs contribute to society besides paying taxes, yet other 
forces and considerations compel them to do so.  
 
Another maxim relevant for this case could be “We will deceptively portray an image of 
ourselves we do not live up to”. The connection here is obviously those companies who 
publicly support transparency yet fail to follow through with actions. In a world where 
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everybody says they are something they are not, lying and deception is the norm. Nobody 
would trust each other, making all efforts to improve a corporate image useless. The 
incentives to focus on corporate social responsibility are lessened as the publicity reward 
disappears. Companies and corporations would be viewed as inherently morally corrupt 
because of their deception. However, this world will not work. As in the example in the 
theory section this world will have no trust, and with no trust deception does not work, 
because there is nothing to take advantage of. If everybody lies and expect everybody else to 
lie there is nothing to gain from a lie. This contradiction makes the maxim inconceivable in a 
world governed by the maxim as a universal law. The implication for this thesis is that the act 
of publishing documents and statements which portrays the company to operate with a high 
transparency when in fact they do not is immoral.  
 
In addition to the problem of transparency is the problem that money is being paid to a 
kleptocracy at all. A maxim to be assessed that relates to this problem could be “We will 
support corrupt governments if it allows us to achieve what we want”. The problem of 
supporting corrupt governments is that it gives them legitimacy, because any kind of support 
shows that a company or organization recognizes them as the legitimate rulers of the country. 
Financial support also gives corrupt governments a better chance of staying in power. If the 
whole world were governed by this maxim as a universal rule nobody would balk at doing 
business with corrupt partners, as long as there was some gain to be made. The risks of 
engaging in corruptive behavior for governments will be greatly reduced and corruption is 
likely to increase worldwide. Corruption is a force that works against human flourishing. This 
world will be able to function though, and the maxim is conceivable in such a world. There 
are no obvious contradictions in a world where all organizations supported corrupt 
governments in return for some gain, perhaps except that organizations with the function of 
combating corruption would cease to exist. Yet one cannot rationally will this maxim to be 
acted upon, because it leads to perpetuated and increased corruption, which in turn constrains 
or reduces human flourishing. This perspective could be useful to MNCs, as it shows that 
Angola should not be treated as a special case where ordinary moral rules do not necessarily 
apply. With a deontological perspective the act of paying money to a known kleptocracy is 
considered morally wrong. There is a contrast here with the results from the consequentialist 
perspective, where it was found that the best solution (and therefore the morally right choice) 
included continuing payments to the Angolan Government. In deontology some choices or 
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acts are strictly forbidden to make. This makes it hard to figure out exactly what to do about 
the situation in Angola where every choice could include elements that are immoral.  
 
It is also possible to focus on what is moral rather than what is immoral. A maxim used as an 
example could be “We will consider the impact of our actions on all affected parties, not just 
our closest partners”. This maxim covers much of the spirit behind corporate social 
responsibility. If every actor had a wider perspective when evaluating their actions it would 
lead to a world of higher moral standard, as considering all affected parties is central in ethics, 
especially in consequentialism. When an increasing number of decisions or actions made are 
morally right the world should be a better place with a higher degree of human flourishing. 
There are no contradictions between this maxim and the world it would create. One is also 
able to will this world to be and the maxim to be followed because it increases happiness or 
human flourishing, which is defined as the only end willed by all. For companies in Angola 
this means their CSR activities and social projects are morally right, which is perhaps not 
surprising. Take note that deontology does not try to maximize the consequences, so an act 
that is morally right need not be the very best option available. Spending $1 on health care in 
Angola is morally right, but this does not mean a MNC should settle for a $1 contribution. 
However, one could make the argument that such a measly contribution is a result of the 
company not properly considering its impact on all affected parties, thereby breaking the 
maxim.  
 
A real concern here is the MNCs’ motivations. To be morally right the motivation behind an 
act must be duty. The MNCs should feel a duty to uphold moral laws. If the motivation was 
not respect for moral laws but rather a desire for good publicity the act is not morally right 
because it does not express a good will. The companies researched here were found to spend 
between $2 and $3 million per year on social projects. These amounts are not very large 
compared to their revenues, but it should still be considered morally right to do this. The 
problem is that if the companies really were motivated by duty this would be evident in other 
areas as well, like for example revenue transparency. Revenue transparency should also be 
upheld by moral law, so companies lacking in transparency are doubtfully motivated purely 
by duty. Spending some amount on social projects can be viewed as the easiest way to 
achieve evidence of a company’s CSR focus. Most of the CSR activities are transactions 
between the company and other organizations or initiatives, which does not affect or involve 
the business operations, making it easier to implement. The recipients of the aid will probably 
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not care about motivations, and if we step back from the moral theory it is hard to criticize 
financial aid to education, agriculture and health care in Angola. The only concern is that if 
something other than duty is the driving motivation, like for example publicity, the criteria for 
when a company considers itself to have done enough could be very different. There is 
probably a diminishing marginal utility to CSR spending in terms of publicity, so adding a 
new project could be decided against. With duty as a motivation, the same project could be 
found to be even more effective than previous projects and the decision would be to start the 
project immediately. 
 
Another part of deontology that could be brought in is Kant’s Humanity formula. The formula 
states that humanity should not be used merely as a means to an end. In the transfer of oil 
from Angola to the world market one could discuss whether the Angolan people is being used 
as a means and not an end. They are not used unfairly as labor; the few thousand Angolans 
working for the MNCs are not reported to be treated badly. If there is any aspect of humanity 
that is being misused it would be the ownership rights of the people. The people have little 
knowledge of how their resources are being managed, in particular what the revenues are 
spent for and what is borrowed against the oil. If the people had made a rational decision to 
allow the government to manage their resources there would be no problem. The power 
wielded by the current government can hardly be said to be the result of a rational decision by 
the people, the government has fought to get where they are and to stay there. It does not 
seem rational to let a kleptocracy manage your assets. On the other hand, President dos Santos 
and the MPLA has won several elections. Although emotions get mixed up in elections, there 
is supposed to be an element of rationality in casting a vote. The people’s ability to make a 
rational decision can be questioned though, because of the lack of information available to 
them and the resources available to the sitting government in terms of campaigning. If the 
decision were not rational then the people is being used simply as a means, and the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative, the Humanity formula, is broken. Were the people 
to get their fair proceeds from the oil it would not be possible to say they were being used 
simply as a means, because a large part of the ends would accrue to the people. This is not the 
case in Angola, and the Humanity formula remains broken. This problem is mostly between 
the government and the people, yet by supporting the government, the MNCs play a part too. 
In general the Humanity formula supports many of the earlier findings, among them the fact 
that in ethical considerations the importance of the people runs much higher than any other 
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actors. Any act that is found to reduce human flourishing is likely to break the Humanity 
formula too. 
 
The deontological perspective supplements the other two perspectives. This section has 
brought a better look at the CSR activities of the MNCs, questioning if they really are morally 
commendable. The argument that even more attention should be paid to the Angolan people is 
strengthened here, as is the idea that companies in their consideration of their environment 
must go above and beyond what is formally required of them. Not committing to full 
transparency is also here found to be morally wrong. Paying money to the Angolan 
Government is found to be immoral with a deontological perspective, but there isn’t much 
help in deontology in figuring out the best way out of the situation.  
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6. The resource curse – a worldwide problem 
Angola is rich in oil, yet the economy has not improved for a majority of the people. The 
problem of abundant natural resources and poor economic development is not unique for 
Angola; this is a worldwide trend for countries with a large degree of exports being natural 
resources. A study by Sachs and Warner showed that countries with a high ratio of natural 
resource exports in 1970 experienced stagnation in economic growth the next 20 years, almost 
without exceptions (Sachs & Warner, 1995). This is called the “curse of natural resources” or 
simply the resource curse. Extensive research has been done to see if other factors can explain 
the stagnation besides natural resources, but it is not easily explained by other variables 
(Sachs & Warner, 2001). Exactly why the resource curse exists is much debated; “There is 
now strong evidence that states with abundant resource wealth perform less well than their 
resource-poor counterparts, but there is little agreement on why this occurs” (Ross, 1999, p. 
297). There are economic explanations offered for the slow growth, for example the 
instability of international commodity markets, poor economic linkages between resource and 
nonresource sectors and the so-called “Dutch disease” (Ross, 1999). For the purpose of this 
thesis, the more interesting explanations can be found in the political world. The question is 
why governments of resource-exporting countries seem to manage their economies so poorly. 
Most explanations can be separated into three categories; cognitive, societal or state-centered 
explanations (Ross, 1999).  
 
The cognitive explanations suggest that resource wealth creates a short-sightedness or myopia 
among actors, both public and private. This short-sightedness can cause lax economic 
planning and neglect of other sectors than the resource sector. The mentality in the country 
can create excessive optimism leading to economic bubbles. Cognitive explanations have not 
been empirically tested (Ross, 1999). The societal explanations suggest that “resource booms 
enhance the political leverage of nonstate actors who favor growth-impeding policies” (Ross, 
1999, p. 310). Powerful organizations or actors outside of the government, for example labor 
unions, can keep the government from making policy changes that would adversely affect 
them, even if those policy changes would benefit the country as a whole. Societal 
explanations have been widely used in research of resource-rich countries in Latin America 
who have experienced stagnation (Ross, 1999). It is not certain that the findings can be 
generalized though, as only a small sample of countries have been used. The last category of 
explanations is state-centered. The term rentier state is used and the theories contend that 
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“when governments gain most of their revenues from external sources, such as resource rents 
or foreign assistance, they are freed from the need to levy domestic taxes and become less 
accountable to the societies they govern” (Ross, 1999, p. 312). The first researcher to discuss 
the concept of rentier states was Mahdavy. He suggests that governments who receive large 
windfalls due to resource rents “grow irrationally optimistic about future revenues and devote 
the greater part of their resources to jealously guarding the status quo instead of promoting 
development” (Ross, 1999, p. 312). Another researcher, Chaudry, suggests that “rentier states 
develop poor extractive institutions and therefore lack the information they need to formulate 
sound development strategies” (Ross, 1999, p. 313).  
 
Under the umbrella of state-centered explanations for the resource curse the institutional 
explanations seem most relevant in the case of Angola. The findings from Angola can be used 
to compare with other countries where institutions are inadequate or poor. Many of the 
different explanations have not been properly hypothesized and tested, but institutional 
explanations have. Research by Mehlum et al has tested the hypothesis “institutions are 
decisive for the resource curse” and found it to be confirmed (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 
2006). Their paper separates between two types of institutional environments; producer 
friendly and grabber friendly. With producer friendly institutions economic rents fall into the 
hands of the producers, promoting economic activity. Rent-seeking and production are 
complimentary activities. In countries with grabber friendly institutions rent-seeking and 
production are competing activities. Grabbing is an unproductive activity; grabbers try to 
appropriate rents brought about by others.  
 
“With grabber friendly institutions there are gains from specialization in various sorts 
of unproductive influence activities, while there are extra costs of production activities 
due to discretionary power and favoritism. Typical features of grabber friendly 
institutions are a weak rule of law and a high risk of expropriation, malfunctioning 
bureaucracy and corruption in the government”  
(Mehlum et al., 2006, p. 2) 
 
Having gone through the Angola case it is not hard to recognize these features of grabber 
friendly institutions. The main finding in this paper was that the “resource curse applies in 
countries with grabber friendly institutions, but not in countries with producer friendly 
institutions” (Mehlum et al., 2006, p. 3).  
 
P a g e  | 63 
 
Another study by Boschini et al also finds that institutional quality matters for the 
development of the resource curse. Their research shows that natural resources lead to growth 
when institutional quality is high and the resource curse if institutional quality is low. The 
positive and negative effects are exaggerated if the natural resource in question is diamonds or 
another precious metal (Boschini, Pettersson, & Roine, 2007). Their measure of institutional 
quality is taken from an index developed by Keefer & Knack.  
 
The uncovered ethical problems, issues or challenges faced by the MNCs in Angola will 
probably be found in many other resource rich countries, and perhaps some of the discussion 
with ethical perspectives can be useful in other countries too. It could be interesting to look at 
a selection of countries and see if any statistics are similar. The following table has been built 
for this purpose. All kinds of natural resources can lead to a resource curse, but oil has been 
chosen here, as the oil industry is the main focus in this thesis. A list of oil rich countries has 
been compiled by taking the 40 countries with the highest proven oil reserves (from the CIA 
World Factbook). Other measures include Human Development Index score and economic 
performance in terms of average annual GDP growth, both numbers from the UNDP. The 
column “institutional quality” is borrowed from the research done by Mehlum et al. The 
indicator is a number between 0 and 1, where 1 is maximum producer friendly institutions and 
0 is maximum grabber friendly institutions. The numbers were produced as an unweighted 
average of five other indexes concerned with respectively the rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, corruption in government, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of 
contracts (Mehlum et al., 2006). Unfortunately this data was not available for all the oil rich 
countries. The last measure is the latest available score from Global Integrity’s thorough 
institutional quality research, as used earlier in analyzing the institutions of Angola. Neither 
here is there data available for all the countries. The two institutional quality measures 
complement each other to some degree, so out of 40 countries there are 8 without any 
measure of their institutions.   
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 Country 
 Proven oil reserves 
(barrels) HDI
Annual GDP growth 
1975 to 2005
Institutional 
quality
Global Integrity 
score
 Saudi Arabia     266,800,000,000 0.835 -2,0 % n/a n/a
 Canada     178,600,000,000 0.967 1,6 % 0.97 80
 Iran     138,400,000,000 0.777 -0,2 % n/a n/a
 Iraq     115,000,000,000 n/a n/a n/a 53
 Kuwait     104,000,000,000 0.912 -0,5 % n/a 55
 United Arab Emirates      97,800,000,000 0.903 -2,6 % n/a n/a
 Venezuela      87,040,000,000 0.826 -1,0 % 0.56 71
 Russia      79,000,000,000 0.806 -0,7 % n/a 69
 Libya      41,460,000,000 0.840 2,5 % n/a n/a
 Nigeria      36,220,000,000 0.499 -0,1 % 0.31 64
 Kazakhstan      30,000,000,000 0.807 2,0 % n/a 76
 United States      20,970,000,000 0.950 2,0 % 0.98 87
 China      16,000,000,000 0.762 8,4 % 0.57 59
 Qatar      15,210,000,000 0.899 n/a n/a n/a
 Algeria      12,200,000,000 0.748 0,1 % 0.44 47
 Brazil      12,180,000,000 0.807 0,7 % 0.64 73
 Mexico      11,650,000,000 0.842 1,0 % 0.54 63
 Angola       9,035,000,000 0.484 -0,6 % n/a 41
 Azerbaijan       7,000,000,000 0.758 n/a n/a 61
 Norway       6,865,000,000 0.968 2,6 % 0.96 n/a
 India       5,625,000,000 0.609 3,4 % 0.58 75
 Oman       5,500,000,000 0.839 2,4 % n/a n/a
 Sudan       5,000,000,000 0.526 1,3 % n/a 59
 Ecuador       4,517,000,000 0.807 0,3 % 0.54 60
 Malaysia       4,000,000,000 0.823 3,9 % 0.69 n/a
 Indonesia       3,990,000,000 0.726 3,9 % 0.37 69
 Egypt       3,700,000,000 0.716 2,8 % 0.44 54
 United Kingdom       3,600,000,000 0.942 2,2 % 0.93 n/a
 Yemen       3,000,000,000 0.567 1,5 % n/a 46
 Argentina       2,587,000,000 0.860 0,3 % 0.43 70
 Syria       2,500,000,000 0.736 0,9 % 0.31 n/a
 Gabon       2,000,000,000 0.729 -1,4 % 0.54 n/a
 Congo, Republic of the       1,600,000,000 0.619 -0,1 % 0.37 n/a
 Colombia       1,506,000,000 0.787 1,4 % 0.53 71
 Australia       1,500,000,000 0.965 2,0 % 0.94 84
 Chad       1,500,000,000 0.389 0,5 % n/a n/a
 Denmark       1,188,000,000 0.952 1,7 % 0.97 n/a
 Brunei       1,100,000,000 0.919 -1,9 % n/a n/a
 Equatorial Guinea       1,100,000,000 0.717 11,7 % n/a n/a
 Peru        930,000,000 0.788 -0,3 % 0.32 69
(CIA, 2008b) , (UNDP, 2008d) , (UNDP, 2008b) , (Mehlum et al., 2006) , (GI, 2008b).  
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Many of the oil rich countries have experienced negative or slow economic growth. The term 
stagnation is widely used with two different definitions, either economic growth below 1% 
annually or below 2-3% annually. If the 1% definition is used, a total of 18 countries on the 
list have experienced stagnation in the 30 year period from 1975 to 2005 (3 countries did not 
have economic growth data available). In other words, half of the world’s top oil countries 
have seen little or no economic growth, despite their resource wealth. If only the top 10 are 
counted, 7 out of 10 have had stagnated economies. These observations correspond with the 
research about the resource curse.  
 
Looking at the institutional measures one can search for any evidence of an institutional 
explanation of the resource curse. For the Global Integrity scores any score 70 and below is 
considered weak. The institutional quality index used by Mehlum et al is more ambiguous, as 
no definition is given of what is adequate. Consider a score of 0.5. It does not seem 
reasonable that an institutional environment that favors grabbers just as much as producers is 
considered adequate. The cutoff point must be somewhere above 0.5. Just for simplicity’s 
sake we can pick the same level as Global Integrity, 70% or 0.7. Of the 18 countries with 
stagnated economies, only 13 have available institutional quality measures. Of these 13 
countries only 2 come close to adequate institutions; Venezuela and Brazil. Venezuela’s 
scores are 0.56 and 71, a poor and moderate score respectively. Brazil’s scores are 0.64 and 
73, also poor and moderate scores respectively. It bears mentioning that the Global Integrity 
assessments are in most cases done 10 years later than the institutional quality index from 
Mehlum et al. This could help explain the difference in scores, in addition to the 
methodological differences. We find, then, that the majority of oil rich countries with 
stagnated economies have poor institutions.  
 
A flaw in this table is that the economic performance is an average number over 30 years, 
while the institutional measurements are done for the current year, at least in the case of 
Global Integrity’s assessments. It is possible that the institutions have changed substantially in 
later years, and therefore obscuring the relation between economic growth and institutional 
quality. However, it seems reasonable to think that institutions are more likely to improve 
over time than to deteriorate. This means, if anything, that the institutional quality of the 
countries with economic stagnation is worse than reported, when the whole 30 year period is 
considered. On the other hand recent armed conflicts like a civil war could have deteriorated 
the quality of a country’s institutions, so it is not impossible to have a negative progress in 
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quality. The point is simply that this data is not really fit for quantitative analysis because of 
the completely different time elements in each variable. The best we can do is a simple 
comparison between stagnated and nonstagnated economies. For the nonstagnated countries 
there are 16 with available data on institutional quality. Of these 16 a total of 8 have poor or 
inadequate institutional quality. Comparing the 50% ratio of poor institutions with the 85% 
ratio among countries with stagnated growth there seems to be a notable difference. 
Especially when we consider the fact that the two countries with stagnated growth yet 
passable institutions were only barely above the lower limit on institutional quality, and the 
fact that all of the countries with high quality institutions are countries with normal or above 
normal economic growth.  
 
Institutions do matter, and when their quality is poor it will affect the foreign companies 
operating in the country in some way. Each country will have its unique set of problems, yet 
some of the challenges, for example a corrupt government, are bound to be similar. The 
importance of revenue transparency discussed in this thesis should carry over to all other 
resource rich countries with inadequate institutions and corrupt governments. Although the oil 
industry has been focused upon in this thesis, the resource curse and institutional quality 
connection applies to other natural resource industries as well. 
 
Another relevant table can be found in appendix 9.5. This table shows the largest oil 
companies in the world in terms of oil and gas reserves, along with corruption scores and an 
index that measures the risk of a state collapsing. The Failed State Index is calculated based 
on 12 different indicators of a country’s stability. Examples are demographic pressure, uneven 
economic development along group lines, and criminalization and/or delegitimization of the 
state. The table shows, firstly, that the vast majority of oil reserves are controlled by national 
oil companies. National oil companies are not always, or even usually, subject to the same 
demands of reporting and oversight that privately owned companies are, as Sonangol is a 
clear example of. Furthermore, a large number of the resource rich countries with dominant 
national oil companies are shown to achieve poor scores in both the corruption index and the 
Failed State Index. The contrast between some of the largest oil producing countries and for 
example Norway is notable. Much of the difference can likely be attributed to the quality of 
institutions in the respective countries. 
 7. Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to 
resource industry face when they operate in countries with inadequate institutions and then 
assess the problems from an ethical perspective. 
of inadequate institutions was found.
 
   
       
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
The institutions in Angola as a whole do not promote human flourishing. This means that acts 
that support or follow these institutions cannot be called ethical
problems MNCs face as presented in this thesis. The first problem is th
activities, the MNCs support the government and the institutions in a major way. 
attention has been put upon the financial support that the government receives from oil 
revenues and taxes, but also significant is the legitimacy that i
organizations awards. The second problem, related to the first, was found to be the 
confidential nature of the payments to the government. This secrecy has been explained to be 
a serious hindrance to progress in Angola
government.  
 
Looking at the first problem with a virtue ethics perspective and deontological perspective 
gave an assessment of the actions currently pursued by the MNCs. Their actions were found 
to be morally wrong. With these ethical perspectives the obvious solution would be to cut all 
 
       Actors          Ethics          Institutions         
 
find out what problems multinational corporations 
Using Angola as a case study a clear example 
 
  
. This is the crux of the 
at through their 
nvolvement with multinational 
, because of the unaccountability it provides
Promote         Flourishing
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support to the corrupt institutions, in effect exiting the country. A consequentialist perspective 
allowed for more extensive analysis of the first problem. This perspective found that the 
morally right act was not to exit the country, but stay and help improve conditions. This result 
came from a consideration of the likely consequences of exiting and staying. An important 
connection to make is with the responsibilities that can be assigned to the MNCs. Working 
through the theory and discussion it becomes clear that MNCs have a responsibility to avoid 
acts that harm or reduce human flourishing. This responsibility can be viewed as a negative 
responsibility, in other words an obligation to avoid acts with negative consequences. In 
addition to this the companies have a positive responsibility, or an obligation to pursue acts 
that increase or further human flourishing. This becomes evident with the consequentialist 
perspective and the consideration of responsibility as ability to respond. Because the 
companies are embedded in a situation and institutional environment that does not promote 
flourishing, which could be difficult to get out of, and the fact that they have extensive 
resources at hand, the end result is that their (positive) responsibility is considerable.  
 
Their positive responsibility, perhaps best explained as the responsibility to produce a 
progressively better world, can be hard to specify or quantify. To set a level of effort that is 
considered acceptable or sufficient is beyond this thesis. This thesis can only ask: “Is the 
company able to do more?”. If a company can increase their support of human flourishing in a 
host country with limited effects on their own business, they should feel obligated to do so. 
For the MNCs researched in this case, the funds allocated to social projects seem modest 
compared to their revenues from Angola. A definite answer is difficult, but it does seem likely 
that a company that fully recognized its responsibilities would contribute more. 
 
Concerning the second problem facing MNCs, all the different perspectives agreed that 
anything less than full revenue transparency would be unethical. Pursuing transparency goes 
against the established institutions, like a sort of civil disobedience. Going against institutions 
should not be done in such a way that it unnecessarily antagonizes the local government, 
which could provoke a violent reaction. This seems not to be the case in Angola. To achieve 
the desired effect it is crucial that all the actors take part in the civil disobedience, but that 
does not mean lack of support from other companies is a good reason for any one company to 
refrain from transparency.  
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For any company in the natural resource industry, in any country, this thesis suggests the 
importance of institutional quality. Companies should research the institutional environments 
they are or will be situated in, not only with respect to the formal laws that apply to a 
company, but with focus on the effects the institutions have on human flourishing. An easy 
way to do this is through Global Integrity’s assessments, if available, or indices like 
Transparency International’s corruption perception index, United Nations’ human 
development index or the Gini coefficient. If a company finds that the institutions in a given 
country are inadequate there are two courses of action the company can follow; exiting or 
civil disobedience. Exiting will sever the relationship with institutions that does harm, but the 
decision should be tempered with a consideration of whether the company can do more good 
by staying. If a company does not exit, it should engage in civil disobedience in any way that 
can be imagined to further human flourishing in that country. Beyond going against the 
institutions, companies must also realize the responsibility they have towards the natural 
resource owners; the people. Considerable contributions to social projects that improve living 
conditions, health, and education should be the norm. 
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9. Appendix 
Here is a selection of tables that show key indicators for Angola compared with a sample of 
other countries; some very similar to Angola and some very different. 
 
9.1. GDP per capita (PPP) 
 
Rank   Country  
 GDP - per capita 
(PPP)  
2  Qatar   $           103,500  
5  Kuwait   $            57,400  
7  Norway   $            55,200  
10  United States   $            47,000  
19  United Arab Emirates   $            40,000  
21  Canada   $            39,300  
28  Denmark   $            37,400  
58  Saudi Arabia   $            20,700  
74  Russia   $            15,800  
75  Malaysia   $            15,300  
81  Libya   $            14,400  
84  Venezuela   $            13,500  
86  Botswana   $            13,300  
88  Iran   $            12,800  
104  Brazil   $            10,100  
105  South Africa   $            10,000  
114  Angola   $             8,800  
125  Algeria   $             7,000  
153  Congo, Republic of the   $             4,000  
155  Iraq   $             4,000  
158  Indonesia   $             3,900  
181  Nigeria   $             2,300  
183  Sudan   $             2,200  
221  Central African Republic   $              700  
226  Somalia   $              600  
 
 
(CIA, 2008a). Angola’s GDP per capita is higher in this table than the $6400 IMF reports 
because CIA uses a lower estimate of Angola’s population. 
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9.2. Gini coefficient 
 
HDI 
Rank Country Gini coefficient (%) 
2 Norway 25.8 
4 Canada 32.6 
12 United States 40.8 
14 Denmark 24.7 
33 Kuwait .. 
35 Qatar .. 
39 United Arab Emirates .. 
56 Libya .. 
61 Saudi Arabia .. 
63 Malaysia 49.2 
67 Russia 39.9 
70 Brazil 57.0 
74 Venezuela 48.2 
94 Iran 43.0 
104 Algeria 35.3 
107 Indonesia 34.3 
121 South Africa 57.8 
124 Botswana 60.5 
139 Congo, Republic of the .. 
147 Sudan .. 
158 Nigeria 43.7 
162 Angola 64.0 
171 Central African Republic 61.3 
 
 
The Gini coefficient table is taken from the UN 2007/2008 Human Development Report 
(UNDP, 2008c) with exception of Angola’s score, which is taken from an OECD report 
(OECD, 2008) because it was unavailable from the UN. 
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9.3. Corruption perceptions index 
 
Country 
rank Country 
CPI 
score 
Surveys 
used 
Confidence 
range 
1 Denmark 9,3 6 9.1 - 9.4 
9 Canada 8,7 6 8.4 - 9.1 
14 Norway 7,9 6 7.5 - 8.3 
18 USA 7,3 8 6.7 - 7.7 
28 Qatar 6,5 4 5.6 - 7.0 
35 United Arab Emirates 5,9 5 4.8 - 6.8 
36 Botswana 5,8 6 5.2 - 6.4 
47 Malaysia 5,1 9 4.5 - 5.7 
54 South Africa 4,9 8 4.5 - 5.1 
65 Kuwait 4,3 5 3.3 - 5.2 
80 Brazil 3,5 7 3.2 - 4.0 
80 Saudi Arabia 3,5 5 3.0 - 3.9 
92 Algeria 3,2 6 2.9 - 3.4 
121 Nigeria 2,7 7 2.3 - 3.0 
126 Indonesia 2,6 10 2.3 - 2.9 
126 Libya 2,6 5 2.2 - 3.0 
141 Iran 2,3 4 1.9 - 2.5 
147 Russia 2,1 8 1.9 - 2.5 
158 Angola 1,9 6 1.5 - 2.2 
158 Congo, Republic of the 1,9 6 1.8 - 2.0 
158 Venezuela 1,9 7 1.8 - 2.0 
173 Sudan 1,6 6 1.5 - 1.7 
178 Iraq 1,3 4 1.1 - 1.6 
180 Somalia 1 4 0.5 - 1.4 
 
(TI, 2008a). 
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